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A Critical Approach to Section 1983
with Special Attention to
Sources of Law
Jack M. Beermann*
The Civil Rights Act of 18711 ("§ 1983") establishes a tort-like remedy for persons deprived of federally protected rights "under color of
law."'2 While the statute's broad language provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights, the statute itself provides little or no guidance regarding important subjects such as the
measure of damages, the availability of punitive damages, the requirements for equitable relief, the statute of limitations, survival of claims,
3
proper parties, and immunities from suit.
The Supreme Court has mined several sources of law to fill these
gaps in § 1983. Besides the usual sources of statutory language and
legislative history, 4 the Court has looked to the state law of the forum
jurisdiction; 5 the general common law as it existed in 1871, when Con* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. A draft of this article was presented at
the Eleventh National Conference on Critical Legal Studies at American University. Thanks
to Joe Singer, Gil Verbit, Mike Harper, Cass Sunstein, Duncan Kennedy, Mark Brown, Ann
Althouse, and the participants in the Boston University Faculty Workshop. Special thanks to
T. Alexander Aleinikoff for perceptive criticism and useful suggestions on the draft he commented on at the Critical Legal Studies meeting. Thanks also to Steven Monick for research
assistance and to the ninth floor support staff.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id. The first part of this article is about sources of law in all cases brought under the post-Civil
War civil rights laws. Most of the cases and commentary focus on choice of law in § 1983
cases, and that focus is repeated here, with the intention that much of the analysis apply to
other statutes such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982) (requiring federal courts to
apply state rules of decision "where they apply"); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (requiring that
state laws and judicial decisions be given "full faith and credit" in all courts in the United
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gress passed the Civil Rights Act;6 the general common law as it exists
today; 7 federal common law developed in light of the federal policies
that are implicated in § 1983 cases;8 and federal common law developed in actions brought against federal officials directly under the Constitution.9 Furthermore, the Court has used an array of constitutional
and structural principles not explicit in § 1983 to limit the reach of the
statute's remedy.' 0
Commentators have long attacked the Court's method of construing
§ 1983,"1 charging the Court with ignoring congressional intent; 12 applying false history 13 as a smokescreen for the Justices' personal
views; 14 having inconsistent theories concerning § 1983's relationship
to the preexisting common law' 5 and federal structure;' 6 and, in genStates); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (requiring resort to state law in civil rights actions where
federal law is unsuitable or deficient).
6. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38-45 (1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
257-59 (1978).
7. Smith, 461 U.S. at 34 (acknowledging that the Court looks to both 1871 and contemporary common law to construe § 1983).
8. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986) (refining qualified immunity without
relying entirely on preexisting common law).
9. Damages actions brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials are
known as Bivens actions after the Supreme Court case creating the cause of action, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Malley,
475 U.S. at 340-45 (applying immunity rule of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), a
Bivens action, to a § 1983 case).
10. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (no case or controversy because
injunctive relief inappropriate where past illegal conduct unlikely to recur); Fair Assessment
in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 108, 113 (1981) (no § 1983 damage action
permitted in federal court against state tax collection where legal remedies are "plain, adequate, and complete" in state law); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73 (1976) (no case or
controversy).
11. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Coleman, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congressionally-MandatedApproach to the Construction of Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REv. 665 (1986) (arguing that the Court's
forays into the history of the 42d Congress's legislative intent and the common law of 1871
hinder application of § 1983); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987) (attacking the Court's "misperception"
that there has been a recent explosion in civil rights litigation); Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of
Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 614-15, 619,
628-30 (1985) (arguing that the Court should apply a "transcendent" common law to civil
rights claims, and rejecting its fidelity to 1871 common law); Richard A. Matasar, Personal
Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741,
774, 794 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court distorts the historical record of the Reconstruction Congress's intent in order to hide its own policy preferences); Michael Wells, The
Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19
CONN. L. REV. 53, 54, 87-88 (1986) (same); Eric H. Zagrans, "LUnder Color of" What Law: A
Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 503 (1985) (arguing that the
Court has created "ambiguity and incoherence" in § 1983 litigation).
12. See Coleman, supra note 11.
13. See Matasar, supra note 11, at 781-96.
14. See Matasar, supra note 11, at 788; Wells, supra note 11, at 54.
15. See generally Matasar, supra note 11.
16. See Jack M. Beermann, Crisis? What Crisis? (Book Review), 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1383,
1397-1400 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
(1985)).
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eral, lacking a theory under which to develop the statute. 17 To these
allegations I would add the charge that some Justices are outright hostile to § 1983 and to § 1983 plaintiffs, 18 and veil their hostility only
thinly beneath the most rudimentary, unelaborated "policy arguments." The Court has thus limited the scope of § 1983 without ever
seriously evaluating the arguments for and against rigorous or lax
enforcement. 19

The confusion over § 1983 is a symptom of a larger problem, one
that Gary Peller has called the "impoverishment" of political arguments in our law. 20 We do not have a developed language for address-

ing the political questions that lurk behind legalistic discussions of
§ 1983; instead we apply history that can be manipulated to justify any
result, statutory "constructions" that are never quite convincing, and
policy arguments that are more like incantations of magic formulae
than descriptions of consequences in the real world. 2 1 We argue within
a set of reified conceptions with no genuine attempt to fix their referents in the outside world.
The indeterminacy of legalistic analysis of § 1983 should send us
back to political discussion over the function and consequences of federal civil rights enforcement. My point is not that political discussion is
more determinate than legal argument, but that the sole justification
for replacing overt political argument with formal legal discourse is that
the latter is supposedly determinate and politically neutral. Thus, once
the legal arguments surrounding § 1983 are exposed as indeterminate
and politically charged, the reasonable method for the courts is to turn
back to the political dialogue that legal argument was designed to replace. And by "political dialogue" I mean something more substantial
than what has traditionally passed for "policy analysis" in the law:
Courts, I will argue, should open up the policy debate to competing
theories and data, and assess more pragmatically all available evidence
of the consequences of their policy-based decisions.
The first part of this article examines the narrowly "legal" analysis
of § 1983 in the cases and commentary, with particular attention to the
17. See Wells, supra note 11.
18. There have been several recent references to the "frivolous" nature of many § 1983
cases and to the fact that the federal courts are overloaded with such cases. See, e.g., Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("Many [§ 1983 suits] are
marginal and some are frivolous."); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 91 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the "staggering effect of § 1983 claims upon the workload of the
federal courts" and the "torrent of frivolous" § 1983 claims); see also Eisenberg & Schwab,
supra note I 1 (discussing the perception of overload of § 1983 cases in the federal court
system).
19. The Court often uses empirical observations which are not supported by the facts as
excuses for construing § 1983 narrowly. See notes 177-180 infra and accompanying text.
20. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1153 (1985)
("[T]he politics side [of the equation] has been impoverished.").
21. SeeJames Boyle, TheAnatomy of a Torts Class, 34 Am. U.L. REv. 1003 app. at 1051-61
(1985) (arguing that judicial decisions rely on legalistic versions of precedent and on policy).
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sources of law from which § 1983 cases have drawn. Neither the Court
nor most commentators, I shall argue, have squarely admitted how lit22
tle the methods of interpretation have constrained the choices made.
And the attempt to buttress legal argument with "policy analysis," I
argue in the second part, has also failed, because the cases and commentary display no vision of how one would go about evaluating what is
at stake in § 1983 cases. The third part of the article tries to develop
such a vision, taking a preliminary look at the value choices that must
be made in civil rights cases and raising the moral and political questions that might enable a conversation about them. The debate should
center on what rights should be created and how they should be enforced. The final part of the article suggests a pragmatic approach to
§ 1983 that would open the courtroom doors to detailed studies of the
effects that § 1983 litigation has had on plaintiffs and defendants, actual
and potential. Does § 1983 litigation really vindicate constitutional
rights? Whose rights? And what are its effects on state and local government officials? At present, these questions are either answered tacitly, when the Court and commentators purport to decide cases by
relying solely on text, history, and other sources of law, or they are
assumed away with facile policy analyses and elementary lectures on
"our federalism." While we may not know the answers to these questions, we must discuss them realistically, and admit when our knowledge is lacking or incomplete.
I.

SOURCES OF LAW IN SECTION

1983

CASES

While many recent commentators have agreed that the Court's
"method" in § 1983 cases seems ad hoc, designed to allow the Court to
rationalize any outcome in any case, 23 none of the proposed solutions
avoids this problem. The text and history of § 1983 cannot themselves
establish the boundaries of the statute's enforcement, nor can the various statutory and common law sources that commentators and courts
have suggested. In every case, a decisive choice must be made between
opposed rules, policies, and principles; the weakness of narrowly
"legal" approaches, I argue, is that they fail to face this choice squarely.
A.

The Text and Legislative History of Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that any person who, "under color of" state
or local law, "subjects" or "causes" a citizen of the United States or
22. I do not claim that within the legal system judges experience their decisionmaking as
completely free from constraint or that the legal rules have no effect whatsoever on the way
decisions are made. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:A CriticalPhenomenology, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986). Rather, my point here is that the legal arguments
employed in § 1983 cases do not adequately reflect the factors that are, and should be, important to resolving the issues presented, and that the judges often falsely claim that their decisions are doctrinally compelled, when obvious doctrinal alternatives are readily available.
23. See Matasar, supra note 11, at 794; Wells, supra note 11, at 54.
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other person within the jurisdiction of the United States to be subjected
to a deprivation of a federal legal or constitutional right, "shall be liable
to the party injured" in law, equity, or "other proper proceeding for
redress."' 24 From these words the Court has decided, for example, that
only "persons" are the proper defendants to § 1983 actions, 2 5 that the
statute's causation requirement precludes vicarious liability, 2 6 that ac-

tion is "under color of" state law even if contrary to that law, 27 and that
both federal statutory and constitutional rights are protected under
§ 1983.28 These decisions are not compelled by the language of
§ 1983, and often, as is discussed in more depth in later sections, the
Court avoids the effect29 of the literal words of the statute when it suits
the Court's purposes.
The controversy over the meaning of "under color of" is an interesting example of the way the Court and commentators have manipulated text and history to achieve their desired results. The phrase
"under color of" is ambiguous, and the alternative meanings have different consequences for the scope of § 1983. In holding that action can
be "under color of state law" even if it violates state law, the Court
purportedly relied on clear legislative history.3 0 Eric Zagrans, on the
other hand, argues that the "clear weight" of the same legislative history suggests that action in violation of state law could not be "under
color of law."'3 ' Both the Court's and Zagrans's reading of the legislative history are plausible, but for that very reason, both are open to
dispute. The key analytical weakness in each case is that neither
Zagrans's nor the Court's argument is particularly convincing. Because
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See note I supra for the full text of the section.
25. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961) (cities are not "persons" subject to
§ 1983 liability). "Persons" was redefined to include cities in Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but the requirement of a "person" as defendant was left intact.
See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) (holding that neither states
nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" subject to damages suits
under § 1983).
26. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. Lower courts have interpreted the preclusion of vicarious liability and the causation requirement to impose a heightened causation standard under
which the plaintiff must establish the defendant's personal involvement in the violation. See,
e.g., Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983);
Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'dsub nom. Chardon v. Fumero Soto,
462 U.S. 650 (1983).
27. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-87.
28. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
29. For example, according to the Court, the word "person" does not include state legislators, nor except in equity, state judges and prosecutors. These officials are immune from
§ 1983 liability. See Supreme Court ofVa. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (treating
the immunity issue, but not dealing with the question of "person"). For other instances
where the Court adjusted the scope of § 1983 on policy grounds, see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981) (§ 1983 remedy preempted by
more specific statutory enforcement scheme); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)
(§ 1983 may not be used to challenge unconstitutional imprisonment since federal habeas
corpus relief is available; it is not a damages claim issue).
30. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-87.
3 1. Zagrans, supra note 11, at 555-56.
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each argument depends on a controversial version of the statute's legis32
lative history, neither position is compelling.
This conflict between opposed readings, perhaps unsurprising in arguments based on legislative history, comes to pervade the text itself.
The Court interprets the text with the classical array of interpretive canons; as is often the case, two of these canons lead to opposite results.
On one hand, the Court reasons, since the statute changes the common
law, it should be construed narrowly. But on the other hand, since the
statute grants a remedy, it should be construed broadly. Indeed, the
Court sometimes applies both canons in the same case. For example,
in Gomez v. Toledo,3 3 the Court explicitly stated that "[a]s remedial legislation, § 1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose."'3

4

But in ruling on the affirmative defense of immunity, the

Court expressed its "unwillingness to infer from legislative silence a
congressional intention to abrogate immunities that were. .. 'well-established at common law.' ,,35 Which canon of interpretation should be
chosen is, of course, a question that the text itself cannot answer.
The Court's manipulation of text and history has predictably led
some commentators to recommend abandoning altogether the Court's
search for legislative intent. Decisions, they argue, should be a matter
of "tort policy," 3 6 discovered by a test that balances "the twin concerns

of protecting officers and insuring compensation to the victims of their
misdeeds." 3 7 Dean Nichol has proposed what amounts to a pure policy
analysis under which courts should construe § 1983 "'to make it a
38
more rather than less effective' tool of constitutional supervision."
32. Zagrans relies heavily on arguments from opponents of the passage of § 1983 who
complained that it would be unfair to hold an official liable for action taken in obedience to
state law. He interprets this discussion to mean that the legislators assumed that only officials
following state law would be liable. I find it just as plausible to interpret the lack of discussion
of officials whose conduct was not pursuant to state law as an indication that no one found
such liability troublesome. Thus, only the opponents may have wanted to restrict liability to
those officials violating state law. As Zagrans acknowledges, some statements in the legislative
history contradict his view directly. These he either attributes to legislators who "misunderstood" the statute or dismisses as aberrant. See id. at 555.
33. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
34. Id. at 639.
35. Id. at 639 (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980)). The
remedial statute thus should not be construed broadly if it means derogating from well-established common law. The metaphor of having one's cake and eating it too comes to mind.
36. See Wells, supra note 11, at 69-73.
37. Matasar, supra note 11, at 792-93; see also Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibilityfor ConstitutionalTorts, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 225 (1986) (applying a purely normative analysis
to the application of § 1983).
38. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959, 999
(1987). Dean Nichol claims, however, that this methodology looks at legislative intent. Id. at
999 n.202. This assumption is based on the idea that when a judge follows the procedure,
exemplified in the classic case Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889), of putting
herself in the shoes of the legislator and asking herself what result the legislator would want in
a particular case, that the judge is looking for legislative intent and not making a purely normative decision. See Nichol, supra, at 979 (quoting with approval Judge Posner's restatement
of this method of statutory construction). This method has the advantage of focusing the
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Professor Eskridge has put forward a "dynamic" model of statutory interpretation under which § 1983 would be interpreted "in light of [its]
present societal, political, and legal context."'3 9 These proposals have
the virtue of directing the discussion away from fruitless searches
through legislative history. But because they do not tell us which substantive values should guide our choice of interpretations and why, they
provide no real guidance toward answers to problems arising under
§ 1983. A call for "policy analysis" and an invocation of the present
"context" are empty, when clearly there are competing policies to be
40
analyzed and conflicting values within the present "context."
Proposals like Nichol's and Eskridge's are thus no more than a beginning. But at least they have discredited the idea that one can answer
important questions just by reading the text and legislative history of
§ 1983. These approaches are inevitably selective-as when Zagrans
dismisses contrary legislative history as aberrant or unreliable. 4 1 In interpreting § 1983, text and history answer so few questions that the
Court is forced to look elsewhere, as it sometimes admits. The rest of
this section examines the sources that the Court and commentators
have used to fill the gaps in § 1983.
B.

Statutory Direction to Apply State Law in Section 1983 Cases

Three statutes direct the federal courts, in at least some instances,
to look to state law to fill gaps in the statutory language of § 1983.
These are the statute governing "Proceedings in Vindication of Civil
Rights" ("§ 1988"),42 the Rules of Decision Act (the "RDA"), 43 and the
"Full Faith and Credit" Statute.4 4 In a few cases the Court follows the
judge's attention on the legislature's goals, but it cannot give the judge a real indication ofthe
legislative intent on a particular issue.
39. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Slatutoiy Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479
(1987). I found Professor Eskridge's proposal the most promising of the various attempts at
making sense of § 1983, but he too left many questions unanswered. For example, he claims
that the proper way to think about § 1983 is to look at its "rich interpretive history" and
"policy values." Id. at 1487. In spite of this claim, however, he engages in very little actual
discussion of the statute's interpretive history or underlying policy values. Instead, when it is
time to answer concrete questions arising under § 1983, he proposes looking at modem common law to fill the gaps in the statutory language. See id. ("[T]he common law rule represents
a well-considered modem consensus about when the imposition of punitive damages is appropriate."); see also id. at 1488 ("The modem common law of tort remedies and immunities is
a convenient way to fill in these gaps [in § 1983]."). The values and policies underlying the
common law are likely to be different from those important to the application of § 1983.
Professor Eskridge, by relying almost exclusively on contemporary common law, misses the
opportunity to expand on how evolving societal values and policy problems should change
the enforcement of § 1983.
40. See notes 142-184 infra and accompanying text for my discussion of policy analysis of

§ 1983.
41. See Zagrans, supra note 11, at 540-61; see also notes 31-32 supra and accompanying
text.

42. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
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apparent command of these statutes, but in many other cases, it simply
ignores them altogether.
The most important statute of the three is § 1988, because it applies
specifically to civil rights actions and because it has been interpreted (at
least in some instances and by some commentators) to require federal
courts to "borrow" state law to fill gaps in § 1983. 4 5 Where federal law

is not "suitable," or "not adapted," or is "deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies," § 1988 directs the federal
court to apply "the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum state. 46 The statute also presumably empowers the federal court to create federal common law to fill the
gaps in § 1983 where the state gap-filler would be inconsistent with the
Constitution or federal law.
While the text of § 1988 appears to direct the Court at least to look
at state law whenever § 1983 is silent on a subject, 4 7 in practice, the
Court has applied state law to § 1983 actions in only two situations: 48
state survival statutes 4 9 and state statutes of limitations governing federal § 1983 actions. 50 And in the case of state statutes of limitations,
the Court has partly federalized state law: The federal interest in "uniformity, certainty and the minimization of unnecessary litigation," according to the Court, requires that each state's personal injury statute
of limitations apply, whether or not the state itself would characterize
the particular § 1983 action as a personal injury claim. 5 1
The Court has not made clear whether § 1988 requires it to apply
state law, even in the limited circumstances where it has done so. It has
said, for example, that application of state statutes of limitations is "settled practice" which Congress "implicitly endorsed" in § 1988.52 Apparently the Court is unwilling to admit that § 1988 compels any result,
although it may "instruct 5 3 courts in the results that they reach.
45. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588 (1978); Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 267 (1985).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
47. See Wegmann, 436 U.S. at 588; Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267.
48. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56-92 (1983), epitomizes
the imprecision with which the Court treats sources of law in § 1983 cases. In a footnote, he
attacks the Court for failing to heed § 1988's call to apply either federal law or the law of the
particular state of the district court. See id. at 90 n. 17. But then in the very next footnote, he
cites with approval a suggestion in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.1 1 (1978), that supports his substantive views regarding the issue in Smith v. Wade, even though the Car , Court
also ignored § 1988. Smith, 461 U.S. at 91 n.18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, in one
footnote Justice Rehnquist attacks the Court for ignoring § 1988, and in the next he cites
dicta which sprang directly from the Court's disregard of § 1988-the very method he had
condemned in the previous footnote.
49. Wegmann, 436 U.S. at 584. There is a federal rule for survival of civil rights actions
against federal officials, but there is no indication that the Court will change its practice and
apply that rule to § 1983 cases. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
50. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 261.
51. Id. at 275.
52. Id. at 266-67.
53. Wegmann, 436 U.S. at 588.
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An extensive scholarly debate has taken place over the meaning of
the choice of law provisions in § 1988. The views of the various scholars are surprisingly diverse. At one end of the spectrum, Jennifer Coleman has argued for an expansive role for state law under § 1988.54 She
argues that § 1988 requires federal courts to fill gaps in § 1983 with the
common law, statutes and constitutional law of the forum state, unless
federal law outside § 1983 can fill the gaps, or unless the state law
would frustrate the purposes of the statute. 55 At the other end of the
spectrum, Theodore Eisenberg has argued that § 1988 never requires
federal courts to resort to state law in § 1983 cases, and that its gapfilling provisions apply only in a narrow class of cases commenced
under state law in state court and removed to federal court by the defendant. 56 Seth Kreimer has argued that § 1988 requires federal courts
to fill the gaps in § 1983 with "general common law" a la Swift v. Tyson,5 7 not state common law; state statutes and constitutional provisions
may be relevant, but only so far as they modify the "general common
law." 5 8 Another commentator has suggested that § 1988 requires federal courts to apply state law in civil rights cases only where the state
law bears a "peripheral relationship to the scope and definition of federal rights." 5 9 Still other commentators have either altogether ignored
§ 1988 in discussing choice of law for § 1983 or argued that federal
courts should ignore § 1988 and apply general tort principles, the his60
tory of § 1983, or its purposes, to fill its textual gaps.
Coleman's proposal for expansive application of state law under
§ 1988 is inviting in its simplicity. 6 ' Her proposal tracks the language
of § 1988: The courts, she argues, should look first to the language
and history of § 1983 to make sure there is a gap, then fill any gap with
applicable federal law outside § 1983. If no federal law can fill the gap,
then state law of the forum jurisdiction applies, unless it is inconsistent
with the purposes of § 1983. In that case, the federal court should cre62
ate federal common law.

54. Coleman, supra note 11.
55. Id. at 667, 708.
56. See Theodore Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The ProperScope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1980).
57. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
58. Kreimer, supra note 11.
59. Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 512 (1970) (student author)
[hereinafter Chicago Connent].
60. See Wells, supra note 11; Matasar, supra note 11.
61. See Coleman, supra note 1I, at 722-33. In contrast, Dean Nichol takes a more modest
view of § 1988 and says that while it is not "a model of clarity[,] [i]t does at least indicate that
judges ... are not simply to make it up as they go." Nichol, supra note 38, at 992.
62. Lawyers like three-part tests because they make difficult inquiries look mechanical
and organized. Cf. Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REv. 871, 873 (1986).
Soon after the Court began applying the Reconstruction Era civil rights laws, the Court
was confused about the meaning of § 1988. In an early civil rights case, the Court read
§ 1988 to mean that "both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized, whichever
better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes." Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
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Coleman's chief criticism of the Court's current practice is that it
allows the Court to proceed in an ad hoc manner, choosing from text,
history, federal law, federalist principles, and state law without constraint. In my view, however, her proposal for § 1988 would allow the
Court the same freedom. 63 Indeed, the Court's method is perfectly
consistent with Coleman's recommendations: It has exercised considerable discretion without even reaching the choice of law provisions of
§ 1988, and it has avoided the "constraints" of § 1988 by purporting to
find all that it needs in the words and history of § 1983 itself. If the
words and history of § 1983 provide the answer, there is no gap and,
64
thus, no need to resort to state law at all.

The Court has avoided the § 1988 procedure, however, only with
quite creative constructions of § 1983's text and history6 5-interpretations that reflect a narrow reading of the statute's potentially broad remedial language. 6 6 For example, the Court has construed § 1983 to
incorporate features of the common law that were well-established in
Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969). In addition to the difficulties with the majority's interpretation
of § 1988's choice of law provisions, it is questionable that § 1988 applied to the case at all,
since it was brought in state court. Section 1988 explicitly regulates the exercise offederal
district court jurisdiction in civil rights cases, not actions in state court. Justice Harlan, in dissent, argued that even if § 1988 were applicable to the case, it would require the courts to
look "to state law to see what remedies, consistent with federal policies, would be available
there." Id. at 257 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Recently, however, the Court intimated that while
§ 1988 applies only to federal courts, once it is determined which law a federal court would
apply, the state court must apply that law under the supremacy clause. See Felder v. Casey,
108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988). This suggestion is the most bizarre of all, because it means that once
a federal court decides what state law says under § 1988, the state supreme court is bound to
the federal view of state law. What happened to Erie?
63. Coleman acknowledges that her proposed use of § 1988 will not cure all the
problems inherent in construing § 1983. Coleman, supra note 11, at 722. She claims, however, that her § 1988 analysis improves on the ad hoc application of§ 1983. Id. at 722-23. My
disagreement with her is about whether her methodology is ultimately less ad hoc than the
Court's.
64. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Robertson v. Wegnann, one of the few § 1983 cases
in which the Supreme Court actually adopted state law, noted that in most cases the Supreme
Court fills the gaps in the statute with federal common law created from the common law
background against which § 1983 was passed. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 59697 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Matasar, supra note 11, at 744 & n.7. Matasar concludes that history is of very little
help in construing § 1983, because the context of the debate over § 1983 is so different from
current reality. Id. at 785-90. Gene Nichol, Jr. has called the Supreme Court's methodology
"indefensible," because the Court pretends that the tensions of § 1983 interpretation "do not
exist." Nichol, supra note 38, at 987-88. He points out that in decisions in which the Court
reads § 1983 expansively, it cites legislative history, much of which points toward aggressive
federal intervention into state affairs. But when the Court wants to defer to states, it merely
denies the existence of legislative history to the contrary. Id. at 987. See also Beermann, supra
note 16, at 1398 n.70 (comparing conflicting theories of the proper role of federal courts in
enforcing civil rights against states and state officials). Nichol disagrees with Matasar's narrow
view of the importance of history for § 1983, although his examination of the history leads
him to substantive conclusions similar to Matasar's concerning the usefulness of such history
in construing § 1983. Nichol, supra, note 38, at 988-92.
66. The Court has elsewhere relied on the breadth of the statute's language. E.g., Felder,
108 S. Ct. at 2307 (§ 1983 "is to be accorded 'a sweep as broad as its language' ") (quoting
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
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1871, on the theory that Congress was aware of that common law and
would have realized that any intention to alter it would have to be quite
explicit: As the old statutory construction canon goes, "statutes in derogation of common law should be construed strictly."'6 7 Of course, an

opposite reading of § 1983 is perfectly possible: The plain meaning of
the statute's explicit language implies an expansive liability with no
common law defenses. The Court has chosen the first of two alternative readings and has pretended that only its chosen interpretation is
consistent with § 1983's text and history. Thus, the Court has exercised considerable discretion without even reaching the second step of
Coleman's procedure. Section 1988, it would seem, is hardly a solution
to the problem of judicial discretion.
Coleman, of course, denies that the Court's method is consistent
with her view of § 1988. In many of its opinions, she correctly points
out, the Court has supplemented the common law of 1871 with modem
common law principles. Thus- rather than interpreting § 1983 for gaps
she argues, the Court has simply engaged in judicial
and ambiguities,
68
policymaking.
One problem with this response is that Coleman's notion of "interpretation" is controversial. As noted above, theorists like Eskridge
have argued that statutory interpretation is not necessarily a matter of
recapturing authorial intentions. And even if we were to identify the
meaning of a statute with the intentions of those who enacted it, the
Court's practice could still be justified on Coleman's principles. Because Congress knew that tort rules would evolve, one could argue, it
intended that current tort principles continually replace the common
law of 1871 as such common law became outdated. In that case, the
Court would be true to congressional intent in relying on contemporary common law principles. 69 Whether or not (as Coleman thinks)
these "constructions" are strained, 70 as long as the Court claims it is
construing § 1983 and not making federal common law, 7 1 it can remain
consistent with Coleman's method without ever applying state law.
Moreover, under both its procedure and Coleman's recommendations, the Court can exercise considerable discretion when it does find a
gap or ambiguity in § 1983. The text of § 1988 suggests that where the
civil rights statutes are not "suitable," "adapted to the object," or are
67. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), seem to
adopt this approach implicitly.
68. Coleman, supra note 11, at 723-33. For an illustration of the Court's reliance on
contemporary common law principles under the guise of analyzing the 42d Congress's intent,
see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 30 (referring to late 19th century common law and contemporary common law in discussing punitive damages under § 1983).
69. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 34 n.20. It could be argued that § 1983's reference to "actions
at law" and "suits in equity" atithorizes or even compels courts to apply contemporary common law and equity principles. Congress, the argument goes, knew that rules for such proceedings evolve and did not indicate an intention to freeze § 1983 into the rules of 1871.
70. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 675-80.
71. This is suggested by Michael Wells's work. See Wells, supra note 11.
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"deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies,"
courts may consider other applicable federal law. 72 Thus, the Court

could incorporate doctrines from other federal statutes7 3 and from federal common law developed in other areas. The suitability requirement
gives the Court power to borrow law it likes and disregard law it does
not, limited only by its understanding of what is "suitable." And
§ 1988 does not define "suitability." While some commentators have
suggested that the test for suitability is that the borrowed law advance
the plaintiff's claim, 74 it is unclear why this should be so. For example,
a borrowed statute of limitations will bar some claims, but no one has
argued that § 1988 means that there can be no statute of limitations for
§ 1983 actions.
If the Court should find no "suitable" federal law, § 1988 requires
federal courts to fill gaps in the civil rights statutes with "the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State" in which the court is sitting as long as such law is "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."' 75 Here, too,
courts have considerable latitude of interpretation. For one thing, the
expression "the common law" could mean either "the general common
law" (as modified by statutes and constitutional provisions of the forum
state) or "the common law of the forum state" (as that state has modified its own common law by statute or constitution). Both meanings
find support in the commentary, 7 6 and which interpretation one should
choose is not clear from the text or history of § 1988. The proviso that
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The statute instructs the federal courts to apply "the laws
of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable... [or] adapted to the object" of carrying
the civil rights laws into effect. Id. This should not be taken as license to make federal common law, especially for civil rights cases, because then there would never be a reason to go to
§ 1988's next step of looking for "common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the State" in which the court is sitting. Rather, the court should look to preexisting federal law that might not yet have been applied in the civil rights area.
73. For example, the Court could borrow Title VII's rules regarding burdens of proof or
statute of limitations, much as it borrowed the Clayton Act statute of limitations for RICO
actions. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).

74. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 732.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
76. Seth Kreimer takes the phrase to refer to the general common law which existed
under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Kreimer, supra note 11, at 61828. Jennifer Coleman argues against this interpretation and reads the statute to require the
federal courts to apply the common law of the particular state in which the court is sitting.
Coleman, supra note 11, at 706-08. Although I think that Kreimer's interpretation fits the
words of the statute more comfortably, there are good arguments on both sides, and I do not
find the history cited by either side compelling. Further, three factors make me uncomfortable with Kreimer's interpretation. First, if Kreimer is right that the courts are now free to fill
any gaps in § 1983 with federal common law, then § 1988's structure becomes superfluous to
the extent that no state statutory or constitutional provisions modify the federal common law.
Second, the evidence is not very persuasive that Congress interided to allow federal courts to
apply general common law, especially in light of the more recent repudiation of that common
law altogether. Finally, a surprising effect of Kreimer's interpretation would be that state
constitutions and statutes would modify federal common law. This turns the Supremacy
Clause on its head.
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state law applies only insofar as it is "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,"' 77 opens the door further to judicial policymaking. One might assume, at first glance, that the word
"inconsistent" would require that the state law be contrary to federal
law, i.e., in direct conflict with it, to be deemed inconsistent. But in
fact, the view which the commentators 78 and the Court 7 9 have adopted
is that state law is inconsistent with federal law whenever it conflicts
with the purposes of § 1983.80

This appeal to the purposes of § 1983 seems peculiar for two reasons. First, if the Court were so clear on the purposes of § 1983, it
could simply appeal to those purposes directly when construing the
statute, and bypass § 1988's law-finding process altogether. Second,
the purposes of § 1983 are controversial, and thus it would seem no
less controversial to appeal to those purposes in the context of § 1988.
Whatever the function of § 1988 may be in this one connection, one
thing it clearly does not do, given the disagreement on § 1983's purposes, is guide judicial discretion. To require courts to balance the
purposes of § 1983 against the justifications given for state law is nothing if not a call for judicial policymaking. In each situation, the state
interests in pursuing its policies will run up against the urge to provide
broader remedies. Within our legal discourse, there are good arguments directing us in each direction. 8 ' The federalist doctrine holds
that federal law should be sensitive to state interests and state autonomy, while the contrary nationalist view holds that state interests are
always inferior to federal enforcement of civil rights. In accepting
either of these arguments, a judge will be influenced by her ideological
opinion of the appropriate balance between federal and state power.
The other statutes that refer federal courts to state law, the RDA
and the Full Faith and Credit Statute, are less directly related to § 1983,
and thus can be discussed more briefly. The RDA instructs federal
courts, in actions at law, to regard state laws as "rules of decision" in
civil actions "where they apply."'8 2 The Court, however, never applies
or even adverts to this statute in § 1983 cases, perhaps because it believes that state rules never "apply" in federal civil rights actions, or
perhaps because the issue has never been raised. 83
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
78. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 731-32; Kreimer, supra note 11, at 627-28.
79. See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
80. Either application of the proviso is puzzling: If the state law is contrary to federal
law or inconsistent with § 1983's policies, then either some other federal law or a construction
of § 1983 would already have filled the gap.
81. But see Coleman, supra note 11, at 732 (arguing that there is no federalism problem
with depriving state officials who violate the Constitution of their state law defenses);
Kreimer, supra note 11, at 629 (same).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
83. In other contexts, the RDA is cited as authority for borrowing a state statute of limitations for federal actions that lack explicit limitations periods. See, e.g., Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
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In its opinions concerning the preclusive effect of state court judgments on federal civil rights actions, on the other hand, the Court applies the Full Faith and Credit Statute literally, without considering
whether its application subverts the purposes or policies of the federal
civil rights statutes. 8 4 This literalism contrasts dramatically with the
Court's open-ended construction of § 1983 and its policy-based reading of § 1988. The Court does not explain why it is compelled to literalism on preclusion questions but not on other matters relating to
§ 1983 and § 1988.85
Faced with the Court's silence as to why its interpretive strategies
differ from one statute or factual setting to another, commentators have
sought to develop an unarticulated rationale that would weld seemingly
disparate decisions into a coherent whole. These attempts usually fail
even on their own terms. According to Kreimer, for example, the
Supreme Court has covertly applied his theory that § 1988 never requires courts to apply state common law, but only state statutes; that,
he claims, explains why the Court has applied state law only on the
issues of limitation periods and survival of actions. 8 6 The Court has
not only never articulated anything like Kreimer's reasoning, but has
effectively rejected it by completely ignoring state statutes in the process of creating federal common law to cover immunities or damages
issues. 8 7 Another commentator explains the Court's practice in terms
of the nature of statutes of limitations and survival statutes: State law
can resolve these issues because they are supposedly not "bound up
with" the rights and remedies under § 1983, while federal law should
resolve other issues, such as the measure of damages, because they are
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906). There is a long-standing practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations, and while courts occasionally rely upon the RDA as authority for this practice, at other times they cite no statutory authority, and the borrowing is treated as common
federal practice. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-05 (1966); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463
(1947); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). Justice Scalia argues that the RDA
does not authorize any "borrowing" of state statutes of limitations. Rather, it is a truism,
telling federal courts to apply state law "when it applies." Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at
162 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
84. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984). Although
the Court in Migra did refer to the policies underlying § 1983, it did so in a cursory fashion
and only after engaging in a mechanical application of the Full Faith and Credit Statute.
85. There is also a burgeoning federal common law of preclusion for cases not covered
by the Full Faith and Credit Act. See, e.g., University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986)
(giving preclusive effect to a state administrative decision in a § 1983 case as a matter of the
federal common law of preclusion).
86. Kreimer, supra note 11.
87. For example, many states have statutes on immunities for government officials. See,
e.g., ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-820 to -826 (Supp. 1988) (immunities for governmental
units and officials); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-16.5-1 to -16.5-22 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
On the measure of damages and availability of punitive damages in suits against government
officials, see e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 to -114 (1982 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE
§§ 6-902 to -903, 918, 918A, 926 (1979 & Supp. 1989); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12104 to -105, -201 (Supp. 1988).
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"bound up with" the rights.8 8 The distinction between an issue being
"bound up with" or "not bound up with" federal rights is slippery even
in principle: It is unclear why whether a § 1983 action survives the victim, or the passage of time, is not "bound up with" the rights and remedies that § 1983 would guarantee.
When a scholar argues that a court's decisions can be explained
only by departing from the terms of its opinions, what she has really
said is that the court has done a poor job of writing its opinions. The
point of a court's written opinion is not simply to announce the result
in the case and to leave the reasoning to others; for that a single sentence would do, and the government could save the salaries of the law
clerks who write the opinions. Rather, the opinion is supposed to reveal the court's reasoning in the case, the factors that led to its decision,
and the factors the court rejected or chose to ignore. If the Court's
reasoning is bad, commentators should criticize it and perhaps propose
new reasoning; if an unstated rationale is motivating the Court, commentators should bring forward evidence of that fact, evaluate the secret rules, and criticize the Court for not revealing its true reasoning.
The commentary on § 1983, certainly no less than other legal commentary, too often expends its energy in constructing theories that attempt to make consistent all the seemingly inconsistent things the
Court has done. If the Court's cases are inconsistent on the reasoning
the Court itself has offered, perhaps scholars should seek not just to
rationalize the inconsistencies, but to replace the legal paradigm that
produced them.
C. Non-Statutory Choice of Law in Section 1983 Cases
As suggested above, the Court does not always decide the choice-oflaw question in § 1983 cases by referring to one or another federal
choice-of-law statute. Sometimes it selects its source of law even more
eclectically. In these cases, the Court has relied on four sources to fill
the gaps in § 1983: the general common law as it stood in 1871, when
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act;89 the general common law as it is
currently understood;90 federal common law developed in light of federal policies implicated in § 1983 cases; 9 1 and federal common law de88. Chicago Comment, supra note 59, at 512.
89. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57
(1978). I will refer to this common law-the common law of the mid- to late-nineteenth century, which the Congress allegedly incorporated into § 1983-as the framers' common law or
the common law of 1871.
90. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 34-35 (acknowledging that the Court looks both to past-that
is, 1871-and contemporary common law to construe § 1983). I do not mean to endorse the
notion that there is such a thing as "the general common law."
91. This federal common law may appear to be statutory construction, but the doctrines
do not purport to flow directly from the words of the section. Instead, they arise from applying the general policy goals of the statute. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496,
51215 (1982).
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veloped not in § 1983 cases but rather in actions brought against
federal officials directly under the Constitution.9 2 The Court's choice
of law seems to be determined by the issue it is considering: It relies on
one source to decide immunities questions and another to fix the measure of damages. In what follows, I outline a few examples of the various sources of law and illustrate the confusions in the Court's extrastatutory method of choosing its sources.
1. Immunities: The common law of 1871 andfederal common law in
Bivens cases.
The Court relies on the common law of 1871 to grant immunities to
many potential defendants, again applying a modernized version of the
old canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be
construed strictly.9 3 The Court's theory is not so much that the common law is the embodiment of true reason, but rather that since Congress knew about the important aspects of that common law, it
intended to incorporate all aspects of the common law that were not
explicitly changed by § 1983.
We saw earlier that in some cases the Court interprets statutory silence to trigger § 1988's choice-of-law provisions. 9 4 The Court never
explains why, in the immunities context, statutory silence should lead it
to the common law. The Court is therefore either confused about the
importance of statutory silence or it is deciding on some other basis
what source of law it should consult. Despite commentators' valiant
efforts to explain how the Court chooses between § 1988 and other
sources, 95 the Court itself articulates no theory, and seems unaware
that something is amiss. Without some explanation of why silence
92. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-45 & n.2 (1986) (bringing § 1983 qualified
immunity in line with Bivens rules). In Malley, the Court applied the immunity rule of Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), a Bivens action, to a § 1983 case, without considering
whether the immunity developed for Bivens actions was consistent with the text, history, or
purposes of § 1983. On Bivens actions generally, see note 9 supra.
93. See generally Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527 (1947) (discussing the difficulties of statutory construction); RogerJ. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CAT. b.L. REV. 401 (1968) (discussing the history of
common law statutory interpretation). This canon seems to have arisen from judicial hostility
to statutes in the heyday of the common law, when it was believed that the common law was
the embodiment of reason. The use of this canon in § 1983 cases arises not from hostility to
statutes generally, but to § 1983 in particular.
94. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (§ 1983 contains no immunities "on its face"). The immunities cases, which apply well-established common law immunities (from the common law of 1871) to § 1983 cases, use statutory silence to invoke the
background common law. See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980); Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980) ("[N]o mention is made [in § 1983] of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted.").
Compare all of these cases with Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1978) (silence on survival of actions requires resort to § 1988) and Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)
(silence of § 1983 is license to look to general common law background).
95. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
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leads it to the common law of 1871 when considering immunities, the
Court's claim that it is compelled to apply that law rings hollow.
The earliest § 1983 immunity cases deny that Congress intended to
abolish the well-established common-law immunities with the "general
language" of § 1983, which makes all "persons" potential defendants
and which contains no immunities. 9 6 But while these cases often purport to follow the contours of 1871 common law in deciding the scope
of the immunity granted to each official, 9 7 modem principles of tort law
always seem to have influenced the Court's decisions. In Pierson v. Ray,
for example, the Court relied on nineteenth century cases to justify absolute judicial immunity, but also cited cases and other materials from
the 1950s and 1960s in support of its decision on the scope of immunity for police officers. 98 Some theories, such as the view that the framers of § 1983 intended the statute to develop along with the common
law, could explain the Court's reliance on contemporary law. 99 But the
Court offers no such theory, perhaps because then its reliance in the
first half of this opinion on nineteenth century opinions would have
been wrong.
The Court has stated in some cases that it looks to a combination of
nineteenth century common law and contemporary common law to fill
gaps in § 1983.100 It has not, however, explained how this combination
relates to Congress's intent, even though the Court insists that its only
function is to "interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not
to make a freewheeling policy choice." 10' The Court, in filling the gaps
in § 1983, is engaged in just that freewheeling policy choice which it
claims it lacks authority to do. Indeed, this is nowhere more clear than
in the immunities area, where the early reliance on 1871 common law
has given way to a body of law that can be accurately characterized as a
pure federal common law of immunities.
Recent developments regarding the qualified immunity demon96. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
In these cases the Court relied on general common law, not the common law of any particular
jurisdiction. In fact, Tenney and Pierson cited, almost exclusively, English and federal cases,
many from the late nineteenth century. Also cited were treatises and the Restatement of Torts.
97. The general approach the Supreme Court follows is to grant each official an immunity tied to her function rather than her title. The Court purports to look to the common law
to determine each official's immunity. For example, the Court has determined that, at common lawjudges were absolutely immune to liability for damages. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 55354 (1967). Thus, under the functional approach, all officials acting in a judicial capacity are
entitled to absolute judicial immunity, regardless of their title and regardless of which branch
of government they work for. See Supreme Ct. ofVa. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 73435 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978). The functional approach itself is
a creation of the Supreme Court; there is no common law authority cited in its support.
98. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55 & n.10.
99. The Court suggests this in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 & n.2 (1983), and in
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). However, the Court has only sporadically argued that § 1983 should evolve with the common law.
100. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 30 (1983).
101. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986).
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strate this shift to federal common law. In Wood v. Strickland,'0 2 the

Court held that an official-who at common law held a qualified immunity-would be subject to damage liability only if either the constitutional right at issue were clearly established (the objective element) or
if the official acted with malicious intent (the subjective element).
While the Court relied on nineteenth century common law for its conclusion that the school board members in Wood were entitled to a qualified immunity, the pedigree of the two-pronged test establishing the
scope of the immunity is uncertain, and the Court cited no authority to
support it.1 03 The Court did discuss the policy of allowing school
boards to function free of the constant threat of damages for every constitutional mistake,' 0 4 and one can only conclude that the Court created the test as a matter of federal common law.
Without even a nod to the history of common law immunities, the
Court later modified the Wood test to make it more difficult for victims
05
of civil rights violations to recover damages. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,1
the Court eliminated the subjective element of the test because, in its
opinion, bare allegations of malice permitted too many cases to get past
summary judgment. 0 6 Harlow was not a § 1983 case, but a Bivens action brought against federal officials directly under the Constitution-a
cause of action created by the Court as a matter of federal common
law-and, consequently, the intent of the framers of § 1983 was not
relevant.' 0 7 However, the Court has applied this new qualified immunity in § 1983 cases without discussing its authority to modify a test that
was supposedly faithful to Congressional intent. And the Court contin08
ues to insist that it is not making policy.'
Defenders of the Court's practice might argue that while the Court
does make policy when determining the scope of the immunity, it applies
history to determine who is immune. Officials absolutely immune at
common law are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights damages. Officials who historically enjoyed qualified immunity may still receive qualified immunity; only the scope of their immunity is
determined by federal common law developed in light of underlying
policies. The Court, however, has never said anything like this. 10 9 And
102. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
103. Id. at 321-22.
104. Id. at 318-21.
105. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
106. The Court's theory was that the threat of a trial might deter officials from doing
their jobs effectively. The Court also pointed to the time and energy devoted to defending
against suits as counseling a broader immunity for officials. Id. at 814, 819.
107. The Court stated in a footnote that it is "untenable" to have different immunities in
Bivens actions than in § 1983 actions. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30 (citing Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-42 & n.2 (1986).

108. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341-42.
109. However, the Court has used historical analysis to determine the scope of absolute
immunity. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (judges were not immune at common law
from injunctions, and therefore absolute judicial immunity does not extend to injunctions).
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even if it did, the Court would still have tojustify its departure from the
historical method of interpreting § 1983.
In fact, the Court grants absolute immunity to officials without really considering whether they would have had such immunity at common law. The Court looks at the function that the official performs, not
the official's title;' 10 it has held, for example, that administrative law
judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity even though they are
technically executive officials.' I The Court developed this "functional
approach" without considering whether courts at common law would
have applied it. While perhaps in 1871 the problem might not have
arisen, the Court spared itself any historical investigation of this issuedespite its willingness to consider historical evidence in other
circumstances.
The functional approach to absolute immunity remains indefinite in
two ways. First, the Court's judgments as to the functions an official
performs are indefinite and allow for manipulation. For example, the
Court recently held that members of prison disciplinary committeesprison officials who determine whether the evidence establishes that a
prisoner has violated a prison rule-are not "adjudicators" entitled to
the traditional judicial immunity, because the usual judicial safeguards
do not exist in the prison disciplinary setting." 2 However, the Court
has not applied a similar analysis to whether members of local legislative bodies perform a legislative function for purposes of absolute legislative immunity. The Court has granted absolute legislative immunity
to local officials, even when they are unfettered by the normal checks
on legislative authority, such as election, public meetings, and open deliberations of the legislative body. 1 3 The Court has never explained
why the lack of traditional checks on power abrogates immunities for
4
adjudicative, but not legislative, officials. 1
Second, in the case of presidential advisers, the Court has simply
disconnected absolute § 1983 immunity from the common law immunities altogether. While Harlow v. Fitzgerald denied automatic absolute
immunity to presidential advisers, it suggested that on remand the del10. Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731-36 (1980); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978).
111. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-14.
112. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985). These safeguards include a record
of the proceedings, representation by an attorney, cross examination, and the entitlement to a
formal appeal. Id at 206; see also Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (reciting judicial safeguards).
113. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
404-05 (1979); see also Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734 (in promulgating the Code, the Virginia Supreme Court acts in a legislative capacity and its members are immune from suit);
Butz, 438 U.S. at 478.
114. Butz established the relevance of the safeguards for judicial immunity, but for some
reason did not apply a similar analysis in the cases of the other officials it granted absolute
immunity, e.g. prosecutors. 438 U.S. at 515-17. In Lake Country Estates, the Court granted
absolute legislative immunity without asking whether the safeguards of the legislative process
were in place. 440 U.S. at 402-06.
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fendants might be able to establish that their function is so sensitive
that they are entitled to absolute immunity.' 1 5 The Court's suggestion
that some officials may receive absolute immunity because of the importance of their function to the national interest was made without any
common law support." 16
The primary sources of law in the immunities area are thus the common law of 1871 and the federal common law developed in Bivens actions brought directly under the Constitution. The text of the statute
plays no role, since it does not mention immunities. Contemporary
tort theory has popped up only in a citation or two, but has never been
invoked explicitly as a source of immunity from § 1983 damages.
2. Legal remedies: The common law of 1871 and contemporaryfederal
common law.
The Court's wavering between the common law of 1871 and federal
common law in the immunities area is repeated in the legal remedies
area, with the added twist that the federal common law is generated not
by Bivens cases brought directly under the Constitution, but from the
general principles of common law. The two primary issues in legal (as
opposed to equitable) remedies are the measure of damages and the
availability of punitive damages. The statute itself does not address
these issues. In the face of this silence, the main source of law for damages rules has been contemporary common law, although the Court has
not undertaken a thorough review of contemporary damages rules.' 17
For punitive damages, the Court has looked to a mixture of the common law of 1871 and contemporary common law. The Court, of
course, has never explained why statutory silence should direct it to
contemporary common law rather than to the common law of 1871 or
to the § 1988 sources invoked by silence in other contexts.
The most important damages rule for § 1983 limits recovery to injuries compensable at common law. This rule excludes damages based
only on the "importance" of the right that was violated: Common law
principles, the Court claims, rarely presume damages and never grant
115. 457 U.S. 800, 811-12 (1982).
116. Id. at 812 & nn.18-19. The concurring opinion in the lower court in Cleavinger v.
Sa uer suggested that the prison disciplinary committee members should not receive absolute
immunity because they were too low in the government hierarchy to be important enough for
absolute immunity. See Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 675-76 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Cudahy, J., concurring), affd sub norn. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985). The
Supreme Court did not accept this ground for denying absolute immunity, and it apparently
believed that the issue is the importance of the function as a whole, rather than the importance of the particular position. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201-02. This distinction may collapse,
however, if the Court allows functions to be narrowly defined so that only a few people perform the function. The best example of this possibility would be the grant of absolute immunity to whomever fulfills the function of being the President. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731 (1982). There was no common law support for this decision.
117. See Wells, supra note 11, at 55. Wells also disagrees with the Court's conclusions
about common law damages rules. Id. at 82-86.
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substantial compensatory damages merely because an important right
has been violated. 1 18 Without a recognized common law injury, a
plaintiff can recover only nominal damages.
The Court claims that its limitation of damages recovery to common
law injuries is justified because this limitation is consistent with the purposes of § 1983.119 The Court reasons that since Congress intended to
create "a species of tort liability," it must have intended that the damages rules be based on common law tort rules. 120 And these rules, according to the Court, do not allow recovery for the "importance" or
"abstract value" of a right. 12 1 The primary purpose of § 1983, the
Court argues, is to compensate victims for tangible, not abstract,
injuries.
This reasoning is problematic for several reasons. First, the Court
assumes that there is some objectively existing body of law known as
"the common law" which provides a set of damages rules. This view is
inconsistent with current theories that interpret the common law as the
creation of particular jurisdictions, each of which chooses a common
law for itself, with substantial freedom to choose the interests it will
protect and to define what constitutes a compensable harm. 12 2 Furthermore, even assuming that there were a coherent body of law called
"the common law" with a unitary conception of appropriate damages
rules, none of the evidence the Court has cited demonstrates that Congress wished to limit the definition of compensable harms to "concrete" or "tangible" injuries as the Court conceives of them. 123 One
might reasonably assume that a Congress granting a damages remedy
for the violation of constitutional rights would define the denial of
those rights as compensable harms. Finally, the Court seems to forget
about other standard common law justifications for damage recoveries,
118. Michael Wells has criticized the Court's refusal to grant damages based on vindication of rights, and has argued that common law courts often award damages that go beyond
compensation. Id. at 82-84. These courts apparently purport to apply a compensatory standard, but the damages are "implausible under a purely compensatory view of damages." Id.
at 84 (footnote omitted).
119. See Carey v. Phipus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-57 (1978).
120. See id.
121. As noted, Wells disagrees with the Court's assessment of the common law. See note
118 supra.
122. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The focus on the common law
could require the Court to change its § 1983 damages rules as state courts change their rules.
For example, many states have recently begun to apply tort measures of damages in economic
disputes that previously would have been decided as contract cases. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct
Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 765-70, 686 P.2d 1158, 116468, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-64 (1984). And courts have become increasingly willing to grant
damages for emotional harms. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355
N.E.2d 315 (1976); Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 14-16, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (1949).
123. The Court recognized this in Carey and allowed for the possibility of a purely federal damages rule for interests not analogous to those protected at common law. See Carey,
435 U.S. at 254-64. The Court, however, never identified the common law interest analogous
to the deprivation of due process in Carey, relying instead on unfocused "general common law
principles" to deny recovery for the due process violation. Id.
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most obviously, deterrence theories. Why it has fixed upon "compensation" is hardly clear. If its theory is that compensatory damages provide exactly the amount of deterrence that the authors of § 1983
intended, its reasoning is inconsistent with its theories in other areas.
The entire immunities jurisprudence, for example, rests on the assumption that Congress wanted less deterrence than a uniform regime of
compensatory damages would provide, since the immunities prevent
compensation from most defendants.
This criticism of the Court's reliance on common law damages rules
is arguably irrelevant: A careful reading of the opinions suggests that
perhaps the Court doesn't really rely on the common law for its damages rules. Carey v. Piphus,124 for example, despite its references to the
common law, can be interpreted as creating a completely federal rule of
damages. While the Court's articulated analysis requires it to look at
analogous common law actions for damages rules, the Court did not
identify a common law claim analogous to the Carey plaintiffs' procedural due process claim. Nor did it cite common law authority for its
refusal to grant substantial damages; its reasoning that substantial damages were inappropriate because the procedural violation had no effect
on the substantive outcome is a purely federal rule. Thus it may be that
reliance on "the common law" in § 1983 damages cases is a sham to
12 5
cover federal common law.
In any event, whether the source of law is common law or pure federal policy, the effect of the damages rules the Court has constructed is
to limit § 1983's deterrence value. Indeed, the emphasis on compensation appears to be intended to deny that § 1983 should be employed as
a broad deterrent or preventative measure.
The Court acknowledges that one purpose of § 1983 is to deter future violations, just as one purpose of damages at common law is to
deter injuries. However, in both cases they do so only to the extent
that liability for compensatory damages is a deterrent. 126 Significant
damages awards in cases like Carey, which involve no common law injuries, could make § 1983's deterrent effect more widespread. Furthermore, the Court has not made a persuasive case against such a role for
the statute.
124. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
125. The Court acknowledged that the purposes of § 1983 may be defeated if common
law rules prevented federal courts from granting damages in some cases. Id. at 258. The
Court stated that if the common law does not allow damages for a tort, federal courts may
ignore the common law and grant damages if the purposes of § 1983 require it. Id. at 258-59.
But in Carey, the Court never bothered to examine common law damages rules, nor did it
consider whether § 1983's purposes required damages. Instead, it simply promulgated a federal "no damages" rule. Id. at 262-67. Once again, the Court used its discussions of sources
of law to hide the fact that it was making policy.
126. See id. at 256-57. The availability of nominal damages plus attorney's fees under
§ 1988 means that civil rights actions will at least create more of a deterrent than a tort remedy without fee-shifting. See id. at 257 n. 11.
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As for punitive damages, § 1983's silence has once again led the
Court to modem and old common law. But contrary to the more contemporary focus for compensatory damages, the Court's punitive damages analysis focuses obsessively on nineteenth century cases. In Smith
v. Vade, 12 7 the leading case on the standard for punitive damages
under § 1983, both the majority and Justice Rehnquist's dissent cite
dozens of cases from the late nineteenth century to support their respective views on the proper standard for punitive awards, on the theory that the framers of § 1983 intended to incorporate the rule that
prevailed at that time.128 And the terms of the disagreement between
the majority and the dissent concern what the nineteenth century rule
the Court departs from Carey's focus
was. There is no discussion of why
29
on contemporary common law.'
3.

Injunctions: The 'federal common law" of equitable remedies.

The final set of remedies issues-standards for injunctive relief-is
still more confusing. Here the Court often mixes together traditional
equity issues, federalist limits on equitable relief, and constitutional issues regarding the justiciability of the case as a whole. Section 1983
provides for suits in equity, but is silent on the requirements for equitable relief. The Court fills this gap with equity rules of its own making
without giving much attention to the source of its doctrines. Instead, it
relies exclusively on contemporary federal equitable standards, a sort
of federal common law of equity.
The Court has employed equity doctrines in many different contexts
to limit the reach of § 1983. For example, despite the Court's holding
in Mitchum v. Foster'3 0 that the statute is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,' 3 ' the Court has erected a heightened irreparable harm
requirement for § 1983 injunctions against unconstitutional state proceedings.' 3 2 The Court bases this decision on the special nature of federal-state relations.1 33 The Court has similarly imposed, as a matter of
equitable restraint, limits on federal court power to intervene into unconstitutional practices by local government agencies.' 3 4 In these
127. 461 U.S. 30 (1983). In Car, the Court appeared to assume that punitive damages
were available in § 1983 cases, but the issue was not settled until Smith v. Wade. Id. at 35.
128. See. id. at 38-48; id' at 60-65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Justice O'Connor, in a separate dissent, argued that the contradictory citations in
the Court's opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dissent proved that there was no consensus in
1871 on the standard for punitive awards. She would therefore, as a matter of policy, have
adopted a restrictive standard for punitive awards. Id. at 92-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
132. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1987); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971).
133. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-05 (1975).
134. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-13 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 377-80 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-502 (1974).

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:51

cases, as in § 1983 equity cases generally, the Court is less than clear as
to its source of law.
One reason the Court may be less attentive to choice of law issues in
equity cases is that federal equity practice has traditionally assumed a
body of law, derived from English Chancery Court practice,' 3 5 that
functions independent of state law. The statutory scheme for federal
equity practice, both generally and with specific regard to civil rights
actions, has supported this assumption, since it has not explicitly required the federal courts to apply state law. Early versions of the RDA,
dating back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, required federal courts to apply state rules of decision only to actions "at common law" in the federal courts. 136 And while amendments in 1945 substituted the words
"civil actions" for "trials at common law,"' 3 7 thus requiring federal
courts to apply substantive state law in equity actions as well, the law
establishing the proper conditions for injunctive relief has been
deemed "jurisdictional" and is still exclusively federal, even in diversity
cases.'

38

The Court never mentions the possibility of applying the equity
doctrines of 1871, or the law of the forum state, to decide whether an
injunction should be granted under § 1983. As discussed above, in
damages issues the Court sometimes holds that the law of 1871 is vital,
because Congress intended to incorporate that law into § 1983, while
for other issues state law is incorporated under § 1988. The failure to
focus on either the law of 1871 or the particular state's law in equity
cases seems to leave the Court with more discretion in granting equitable relief than in granting legal relief. Since the 1871 and state law
focuses constrain the Court very little, there is an inconsistency here, in
form if not in substance.
4. Exhaustion of remedies: Federalcommon law.
The usual practice in the United States is for governments and government agencies to require claimants to exhaust intra-agency remedies, and sometimes other administrative remedies, before filing a
135. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1945).
136. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
138. Federal equity jurisprudence has always maintained that the existence of appropriate conditions for equitable relief is jurisdictional. State law that made injunctions easier or
more difficult to obtain thus expanded or contracted the federal equity jurisdiction, and it is a
fundamental jurisprudential tenet that state law may not affect the scope of federal jurisdiction. This rule has its problems, however. If state substantive law grants a right that would
not be recognized by federal law, and equity allows an injunction to vindicate the right, for all
intents and purposes state law has expanded the federal equityjurisdiction. Be that as it may,
the Court feels free to create a body of equity jurisprudence and apply it to expand or limit
the reach of the § 1983 remedy.
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court action against government.' 3 9 The Supreme Court rejected such
a rule for § 1983 cases, on historical and policy grounds. The Court
reasoned that an exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with
Congress's intent to provide an immediate federal remedy for § 1983
violations, and that such a requirement might prove harmful to the interests of civil rights plaintiffs. The Court thus concluded that the exhaustion requirement was not appropriate in § 1983 cases.
Notice the terms on which this argument was conducted. The Court
did not ask what the state rules for exhaustion are (as might be required
under § 1988) or what the prevailing rule in 1871 was (as is sometimes
done to determine Congressional intent). If there were a well-established practice of exhaustion in 1871, then the Court should perhaps
take statutory silence on the matter as an intent to incorporate widespread practice. The mere fact that the rule would frustrate § 1983's
central policy of providing an immediate federal forum should not itself
defeat the exhaustion requirement, since a similar argument does not
prevent immunities from defeating another central policy of § 1983that of compensating victims. There may or may not have been a settled practice in 1871; the point is that the Court has never even posed
that question.
The objection might be raised that when the Court held that Congress intended to provide an immediate federal forum for § 1983 plaintiffs, its focus was on the legislative history, and that it was therefore
simply construing the statute, not making common law. Obviously, the
difference between statutory construction and making federal common
law is a matter of degree. The Court, however, is not pointing to statutory language to justify its result, but looking at more general policies it
finds behind the language. And across the spectrum of § 1983 cases it
has not only interpreted what is apparently the same phenomenonstatutory silence-in different ways, it has never bothered to explain
why § 1983's silence should lead it to four different bodies of law.
There is no developed body of law governing choice of law in
§ 1983 cases, just a hodgepodge of different approaches. But this uncertainty actually exists at two levels, that of choosing law and that of
applying the law once chosen. Thus, even if the Court were to develop
doctrines that could determine which body of law to consult in any particular case, each source of law would still provide little if any guidance
in the application.
The greatest difficulty in construing § 1983, particularly but not exclusively at the level of application, is that there is no agreement on the
purposes of § 1983 and how broadly it should be read and applied.
The consensus in the commentary has been that the history of § 1983 is
139. Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988), held that these state requirements are
inapplicable when § 1983 actions are brought in state court.
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too indefinite to give real guidance on most questions, and that the
Court should admit
that it is making policy and not engaged in statu140
tory construction.
The Court itself has been made aware of this view. In Smith v. Wade,
after examining the hundreds of citations in the majority and dissenting
opinions to nineteenth century punitive damages cases, Justice
O'Connor argued that the Court should admit that history gave no
clear answers for that case; the Court, she argued,1 should instead look
14
to the policies underlying § 1983 for guidance.
The policies, however, are as indeterminate as the history. In the
next section, I examine the typical policy arguments made in § 1983
cases and seek to expose the weaknesses of traditional policy analysis.
II.

FRIVOLOUS CASES MAKE BAD LAW: POLICY
AND LIMITS ON SECTION

1983

The unmistakable undertone of hostility in many Supreme Court
opinions
suggests that some justices think § 1983 cases are often frivolous, 14 2 presenting controversies that are of no legitimate federal concern, and holding state officials and programs hostage to federal civil
rights liability. This hostility is at least partly self-generating: As the
Court tightens up on § 1983 liability, the plaintiffs appear more and
more to be reaching for a legal theory, and to be going against the
grain of the Court's restrictive civil rights jurisprudence.
The Court cloaks its hostility with the standard policy arguments
that are familiar to every first-year law student. Policy analysis in
§ 1983 cases purports to weigh the value of greater enforcement
against the consequences for government that such enforcement entails. The spectrum of the Court's policy arguments here is narrow, not
encompassing the more explicitly normative questions behind § 1983
enforcement.14 3 Nor does the Court adequately examine its empirical
assumptions as to the effects that vigorous (or lax) civil rights enforcement might have. It simply rehearses its familiar4 arguments, most of
14
which concern the nature of "our federalism."'
These "policy arguments" have become the new formalism in our
law. Although their proponents may use the realist-sounding word
"policy," these arguments have little to do with the policy analysis that
the legal realists sought to substitute for doctrinal analysis. 145 The
140. See Matasar, supra note 11, at 794-96; Wells, supra note 11.
141. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 92-94 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
142. See note 18 supra.
143. The policyjudgments made by courts and commentators are colored by their moral
and political views regarding the desirability of § 1983 enforcement. See Jack Beermann &
Joseph Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property inJobs, 23 GA. L. REV.
911 (1989). It is useful for the purposes of analysis, however, to attempt to isolate the policy
arguments from their moral roots.
144. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 229-31 (1972).
145. On the connection between legal realism and both mainstream and critical legal
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realists hoped that social science could provide a window between the
legal system and the world, but their followers have not incorporated
serious empirical research into legal analysis. In any event, the window
the Court has installed in its § 1983 cases is opaque.
Policy analysis in § 1983 jurisprudence, as we will see, is infected
with the same problems as doctrinal analysis. 14 6 In this section, I examine closely the policies that the Court espouses in § 1983 cases. Because its "policy" constructions of § 1983 place little constraint on the
Court, I will conclude, they are illegitimate surrogates for the political
analysis they assume away. As analysis, the Court's reasoning is insufficiently empirical; as policy, it is insufficiently political.
A.

The General Purposes of Section 1983

Compensation for injuries related to constitutional violations, deterrence of future violations, and vindication of constitutional rights are
the most frequently cited purposes of § 1983. One could argue from
the history underlying § 1983 and from the Court's early opinions construing the statute that the most important purpose the statute could
serve would be prevention, either direct, through injunctions, or indirect, through the deterrence of damage awards. But the Court's remedies rules make prevention a secondary goal at best. Throughout the
history of § 1983 enforcement, which began in the 1960's, the Supreme
Court has stressed § 1983's tort-law pedigree and has identified the primary policy of § 1983 as compensation for those denied their federal
rights. 147 While initially the tort analogy served to justify an expansive
reading,' 4 8 lately it has limited the scope of § 1983 to only those constitutional violations which cause, or threaten to cause, injuries recog14 9
nized by common law.
Nor does the Court freely grant a damages remedy in all cases of
common law constitutional injury. On the contrary, it has left most
such injuries uncompensated, often on the ground that federal intervention would disrupt the operation of local government.' 5 0 As Professor Whitman points out, by granting immunities, imposing strict
causation requirements, and forbidding vicarious liability against governmental entities, the Court ensures that § 1983 will not even be an
theory, see Peller, supra note 20, at 1219-59. Peller sees a link between the more radical
strand of legal realism and contemporary critical legal studies. Id. at 1222-23.
146. For a discussion of the problems infecting doctrinal analysis, see Boyle, supra note
21; Peller, supra note 20.
147. See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2307-08 (1988); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
254-57 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled on other grounds by Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
148. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
149. See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-10 (1986);
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-13 (1983).
150. Cf Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 5, 41-42 (1980) (arguing that courts should prefer equitable damages to money damages because money damages often disrupt local governments).
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effective compensatory device.' 5 1
The identification of compensation as the primary purpose has suppressed another set of purposes: the vindication of rights 5 2 and maintenance of constitutional limits against the intrusions of state
government. That is not to say that a determinate set of rights exists
that the Court refuses to enforce. The Court has, itself, identified
rights that § 1983 is to enforce, as well as limits on state government
activity that the statute is to maintain, but its decisions allow these
rights and limits to be violated without the imposition of any serious
liability under § 1983. Many potential constitutional violations cause
little or no injury cognizable in tort, but still seriously transgress constitutional limits. The Court has recognized that deterrence of constitutional violations is a goal of § 1983.153 But since punitive damages are
rarely available, a plaintiff's recovery will be limited in most cases not
involving common law injury to nominal damages plus attorney's
fees.' 5 4 This gives potential plaintiffs little incentive to sue. Thus,
while the legislative history on which the Court relies for its compensation theory also suggests that Congress sought to deter constitutional
violations,' 5 5 the Court has created a whole class of cases in which
§ 1983 creates almost no incentive to comply with the Constitution and
federal law.
If the Court were to grant injunctions freely, it might prevent some
violations that its damages rules leave undeterred. 15 6 Again, the legislative history cited in several § 1983 opinions suggests that the statute's
framers intended to prevent as many constitutional violations as possible. The Court, however, has repeatedly stated that the requirements
for an injunction under § 1983 should be stricter than in other con151. See id. at 6-7, 47, 53-56; Whitman, supra note 37, at 260.
152. The idea of using a statute to vindicate rights is complicated because, in some circumstances, focusing on rights can detract from other, more powerful, possibilities of social
progress. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousnessand the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563 (1984). However, when a right that is desired by a progressive
social movement has been won, such that it is recognized by the courts and is capable ofbeing
protected through § 1983 litigation, then such litigation can be a tool of progress, or at least
help shore up progress that has already been made. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387, 390-401 (1984).
153. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310-12.
154. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (the prevailing plaintiff in a § 1983 case
who fails to show "common law" damages is entitled to only nominal damages); Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559 § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (amending
42 U.S.C. § 1988) (the prevailing party in § 1983 case may be awarded attorney's fees). Congress passed the attorney's fees act to make § 1983 a more effective remedy by giving attorneys an added incentive to take the cases, see S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5909, 5910, and to overrule Supreme Court decisions limiting federal courts' discretion to award attorney's fees, see THEODORE EISENBERG,
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 446-47 (2d ed. 1987).

155. See the discussion of the legislative history in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S.
496 (1982), and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
156. Professor Whitman suggests that the Court rely on injunctions to enforce § 1983
because injunctions would prevent more violations than the imposition of damages. See Whitman, supra note 150, at 47-52.
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texts, because federal court injunctions against state officials pose special problems of federalism. 157 In the most notorious of these cases,
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,15 8 the Court refused to enjoin a police practice that had actually killed people, on the ground that the plaintiff
could not establish that he was likely to encounter the practice again. 159
The Court relied, in part, on the fact that Lyons would be allowed to
challenge the constitutionality of the practice in his damages suit based
on the same conduct. This ruling prompted Justice Marshall to characterize the Court's attitude toward constitutional violations as a "pay as
you go" system in which local governments were free to violate the
Constitution,0 even if the victims died, as long as they would pay the toll
6
afterwards. 1

While the Court often pretends that the statute itself compels these
limits on § 1983's reach, the text and legislative history of § 1983
clearly permit different interpretations. The Court sometimes seems to
recognize this point and adduces policy arguments to support its interpretations of § 1983. In what follows, I discuss the policies that, according to the Court, justify the restrictive readings the Court has given
to § 1983.
B. Federalism and the Intrusiveness of Remedies
The primary policy justification which the Court invokes for its restrictive reading of § 1983 is "federalism." The word "federalism" is,
in one sense, neutral, merely describing a political system in which local
governments and a centralized national government coexist. In common usage, however, "federalism" signifies a theory that would limit
the power of the federal government, ostensibly in favor of local control. I intend the second usage in this discussion.
The Court invokes federalism to support significant restrictions on
§ 1983 protections that both limit § 1983's compensatory remedy and
ensure that the statute cannot effectively prevent constitutional violations. While in particular cases the Court is often unclear as to precisely what policy it means to promote by respecting federalism, over
the years it has given several justifications for limiting the reach of
§ 1983 based on this concept. Its most general justification has been
the policy of avoiding needless friction between federal courts and state
157. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-13 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-47 (1971). But see Puerto Rico v.
Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) (allowing extradition order in federal court and overruling
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860), on the ground that federalism no longer
bars injunctions to force state officials to obey federal law).
158. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
159. Id. at 111-13 (equity bars injunction where plaintiff is not threatened with a future
violation).
160. Id. at 113 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (Marshall characterizes the majority as holding
that the Los Angeles police can continue to use chokeholds "as long as it [the city] is willing to
pay damages for the injuries and deaths that result.").
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governments. 16 ' Federal intervention has also been discouraged because it seems in some instances to threaten a state's ability to formulate and execute its own policies, and some programs, the Court
reasons, can best be pursued at a local level. The Court has only rarely
defended federalism on the ground that it enhances democracy 16 2 or
that it allocates functions to the agency that can best perform
them,
163
even though such reasoning is a staple of federalist ideology.
Sometimes, the Court's reasoning has appeared to be purely nonconsequentialist: The Court has relied on principles of federalism for
their own sake, without considering their consequences. The Court's
struggle to keep ordinary tort cases against states and state officials out
of the federal courts is an example of this strategy. ' 4 The Court has
repeatedly stated that tort cases against state officials do not belong in
federal courts because, on federalism grounds, the Court should not
allow § 1983 to displace state tort law.' 6 5 The opinions do not contain
a hint of the social consequences that the Court is seeking to avoid.
Rather, federalism is treated as a self-evident principle.
When the Court does explicitly advert to its favorite federalist policies-the avoidance of needless friction and the worry that states will be
unable to perform their functions-it sometimes looks for an alternative, less disruptive way to enforce federal rights. 166 The alternatives
67
include raising the federal issue as a defense in a state court action,'
or suing for damages, rather than injunctive relief, in the federal
courts.'

68

In some cases, however, the Court's solicitude for the states'

ability to function has left the victim not only
without a federal forum,
169
but also without any remedy whatsoever.
When the Court worries that a federal remedy will cripple a state's
ability to carry out its programs, federalism plays only a small role in
the reasoning against granting relief. After all, under the supremacy
161. For a description and analysis of arguments regarding judicial federalism, see
Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem, 22 GA. L. REV. 283 (1988).
162. Democracy might militate against judicial intervention, but this is not directly related to federalism; it applies also to the relationship between the federal courts and
Congress.
163. See JESSE H.

CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS

(1980); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence ofFederalism after Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341. The Court decides issues of judicial federalism based on the
policies implicated by federal supervision over the state judicial system. Critics have argued
that the Court neglects the plaintiff's interest in selecting a federal forum. See Wells, supra
note 161, at 284-85.
164. For a more complete review of the official tort problem, see Jack M. Beermann,
Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U.L.
REV. 277 (1988).
165. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
543 (1981); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
166. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981).
167. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
168. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
169. For example, the immunities do not depend on the existence of an alternative remedy, but on the perceived need to protect state officials from suit.
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clause, state courts should grant the same remedies in § 1983 cases as
federal courts, and state officials are presumably indifferent to the name
of the court that grants an injunction or damages award against them.
If state courts do not grant the same remedy, then from the perspective
of federal interests the problem is state recalcitrance, not the existence
of a federal remedy.
As for avoiding friction between federal and state governments, it is
unclear what this friction is and why it is something that should concern
the federal courts. Perhaps the Court worries that it will anger state
officials, for instance state judges, if it halts unconstitutional court proceedings. No doubt states may regret the restraints that the federal
government places on them, but once a federal rule is in place or a
federal right has been recognized, the supremacy of federal law should
resolve struggles between § 1983 and inconsistent state law in favor of
federal law. 170 Of course, if there is uncertainty about the proper
boundaries of federal and state power or the proper reach of the
§ 1983 remedy, then federalism arguments become meaningful and important. But in these situations, the Court needs much more information about the state policies allegedly threatened than its current
opinions would indicate that it seeks. Further, a more efficient method
of safeguarding federal rights which would minimize the disruption of
state activities and reduce the friction between federal and state governments should be adopted, all other things being equal. But the
Court makes no such argument; in fact, it is difficult to find anything in
its opinions beyond philosophical displeasure at federal enforcement of
federal law against the states.
The Court's acceptance of these arguments with little or no evidence of any alleged undesirable consequences reveals two things
about its attitude toward § 1983. First, the Court is clearly not interested in vigorous enforcement of § 1983 or an expansive definition of
the rights it protects; otherwise, friction between the states and the federal government would be the price the Court would pay for aggressive
enforcement. "Federalism" in this context cannot be dissociated from
the Court's substantive preferences for a narrow construction of
§ 1983. Second, the Court has converted an ideological image once
called "states' rights" into a reified picture of social life, supported not
by evidence, but by arguments that resemble incantations of belief
more than descriptions. The Court's acceptance of the states' rights
picture not only reflects its devaluation of civil rights enforcement, but
establishes the criteria against which all arguments for greater civil
rights enforcement will be judged.
The Court's statements about the policy concerns behind damages
and injunctions are hopelessly confused. In keeping with its general
170. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985).
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preference for compensation over prevention, 1 7 1 the Court has often
declined to grant injunctions against state officials on the ground that
injunctions are more intrusive than damages. The Court has, for example, withheld equity relief when damages relief would be available, 17 2
following the familiar requirement that a party seeking an injunction
establish that no adequate remedy at law exists. But in other cases, the
Court has apparently concluded that damages are equally as intrusive
as, if not more intrusive than, injunctions, and has denied damages on
the ground that they are too intrusive in situations where equitable relief might be available. 173 For example, the Court has refused to grant
a damages remedy against unconstitutional state tax collection, on the
ground that federal injunctions against state tax collection are barred
by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 174 and under the circumstances damages would be as intrusive as an injunction. 175 Similarly, since the
Court has held that some officials who are partially or completely immune from damages liability have no immunity from injunctions, it
again appears that the Court thinks damages might be more intrusive
than injunctions. 176 Remember, these are both examples of recognized
rights which the Court has decided not to enforce through the § 1983
action. Without a theory that evaluates the intrusiveness of particular
remedies in specific situations, I can only conclude that if the Court
believes the plaintiff should lose, whichever remedy the plaintiff seeks
will, for the time being, be too intrusive.
171. See notes 147-160 supra and accompanying text.
172. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at I 11. For further discussion of the Court's reluctance to issue
injunctions against state officials, see notes 130-137 and 156-159 supra and accompanying
texts.
173. Professor Whitman analyzes the Court's views on the potential intrusiveness of
damages. Whitman, snpra note 150, at 41-67. She argues that in many cases the Court should
be more willing to grant equitable relief, because damages are sometimes more intrusive than
injunctions and their costs "may outweigh the gain to federal interests." Id. at 48. Yet despite
their "intrusiveness," damages are not, according to Whitman, a strong deterrent: "[W]ith
regard to any particular defendant, the deterrent effect of potential section 1983 liability is
likely to be quite attenuated." Id.
Whitman's analysis depends, in part, on empirical assumptions that she makes no attempt
to prove. Whether § 1983 damages liability deters officials from violating the Constitution is
an empirical question whose answer requires, for example, evidence as to whether the amount
spent on preventing violations and the number of alleged violations change when constitutional limits have been clearly established. Moreover, her claims that damages both have little
deterrent effect and are at the same time too intrusive seem flatly contradictory.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981).
175. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 113 (1981).
This opinion and others leave the impression that federal courts should balk at granting any
remedies that would stop state officials from violating the federal Constitution.
176. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541 (1984) (judicial immunity is not a bar to
injunctive action against a judicial officer); Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S.
719, 736 (1980) (state prosecuting attorneys, although immune from damages liability, are
subject to § 1983 injunctive actions). Legislators are immune from both legal and equitable
remedies. Id. at 731-33.
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Timidity of Officials Threatened with Liability

The policy analysis underlying the immunities provides the clearest
example of the incoherent Court policies limiting § 1983. As discussed
above, once one discards the dubious statutory justifications for the immunities, what remains is a set of policies concerned with the degree to
which damages awards interfere with local governmental functions.
The Court states that the immunities are intended to advance the public interest in freeing local officials from the threat of litigation and liability. Local officials will be unable to advance the public interest
effectively, the Court reasons, if they must constantly worry about personal liability for constitutional error.
I agree with the Court, and with commentators, 7 7 that the more
damages liability an official is threatened with, the greater the tendency
toward timidity. However, neither the Court nor the commentators
have any information about the magnitude of the effects of increased
damages liability. It may be that under the current regime officials are
vastly overdeterred, or it may be that much greater liability could be
imposed without threatening the effective administration of government. Further, there is very little, if any, analysis of the costs of the
immunities: How much compliance with the Constitution and compensation for violations is sacrificed each time an immunity is expanded?
By readily accepting the arguments for personal immunities 178 and
making enterprise liability more and more difficult, 17 9 the Court appears to place a low value even on the compensatory purposes it endorses for § 1983.
The policy arguments used to justify the immunities are the purest
examples of the Court's failure to link its image of social life to the
world. The Court continually asserts that local officials could not function if they were under a constant threat of liability, or even the threat
of having to defend a suit. But it cites no facts or figures to establish
that any particular level of civil liability would cripple government, 180
and the opposite possibility is never discussed-that government and
official immunity might underdeter unconstitutional conduct. While
the harm to the plaintiff from not being compensated is occasionally
acknowledged, the costs of decreased compliance with the rights enforced through § 1983 are not considered at all. The Court has created
177. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U.-PA. L. REV. 1110
(1981).
178. See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) (expansive interpretation of qualified
immunity).
179. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnick, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
180. This failure to point to the specific effects that the threat of liability would have on
state governments stands in stark contrast to the careful examination the Court gave to the
potential costs of state government compliance with federal wage and hours requirements in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1976).
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a distorted and incomplete picture of the world of civil rights
enforcement.
D. Clearing the FederalDocket and Avoiding Frivolous Cases
A final policy that the Court appears to pursue is docket-clearing.
Although research has revealed that the increase in the number of
§ 1983 suits has not been much greater than the increase in litigation
generally,1 8 1 some members of the Supreme Court have claimed that
the federal courts are buried under an avalanche of frivolous § 1983
suits. 18 2 While the Court has stated that § 1983's goals outweigh the

danger of frivolous litigation,' 8 3 the desire to eliminate frivolous cases
has moved members of the Court to advocate strict limits on punitive
damages and to expand the reach of the immunities.
Frivolous cases make bad law, and so do cases the Court perceives
to be frivolous. So many "frivolous" cases are still brought because the
Court itself sends mixed signals about what constitutes a proper § 1983
case. The case law, policies and principles of § 1983 are so hopelessly
contradictory that litigants and their attorneys cannot rationally predict
the Court's response to their claims.
Some commentators have suggested that, frivolous or not, a type of
claim that produces a great deal of litigation in the federal courts
should, for that reason alone, be limited.' 8 4 For example, Dean Nichol
argues that state judges should be absolutely immune from damages,
because otherwise § 1983 cases against them would inundate the federal courts. The theory seems to be that if the federal courts are overrun with cases against state judges, § 1983 will become generally a less
effective statute. But there must be more to the argument. Unless the
cases lack merit-e.g., because the plaintiffs don't really need judicial
relief, or because any relief would be too disruptive of the state judiciary-then the logical solution would be to expand the courtroom, not
close the door.
III.

POLITICS AND PRAGMATISM IN APPLYING SECTION

1983

Legal doctrine and policy arguments in the narrow sense fail to answer the hard questions about § 1983 enforcement. In this section, I
argue that the alternative to these indeterminate doctrinal and policy
arguments in § 1983 cases is a combination of an explicitly political discussion of § 1983 and a more pragmatic policy development.1 8 5 First, I
181.

See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 11, at 668.

182.

See note 18 supra.

183. See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2312 (1988).
184. See Nichol, supra note 38, at 999.
185. I do not, in this article, attempt to set forth or defend my own views about § 1983.
This may seem ironic in light of my criticism of other authors for failing to state explicitly the
normative views behind their doctrinal analyses. However, I do not, in this article, advance a
particular view of doctrine, so I do not find it within the article's scope to articulate my views.
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contend that political argument may legitimately replace doctrinal argument. Next, I develop the contours of the political arguments over
§ 1983, and apply those arguments to a few specific situations. Finally,
I return to the policy problems surrounding the application of § 1983
and develop a pragmatic method for adjusting the statute to resolve
policy issues as they arise.
A.

Section 1983, Indeterminacy and PoliticalArguments

My principal criticism of the legal arguments made concerning
§ 1983 is that they are indeterminate-i.e., that they require choices
made on extralegal and, presumably, political grounds.' 8 6 The
Supreme Court, I have argued, hides behind doctrinal and policy arguments that constrain their authors no more than the political views that
motivated their construction. In this section I argue that courts and
commentators should give up the charade and replace legal argument
with political argument.
Courts and commentators participate in this charade in different
ways. Commentators are far more likely than judges to admit that doctrine is pliant enough to permit doctrinal choices. And most commentators on § 1983 are motivated to write by their political views.
Surprisingly, however, the literature contains little explicit discussion
of the writers' views of the statute: The legal scholarship is short on
principled defenses of either an expansive or narrow scope for
§ 1983.187 In some cases, the author's views can be inferred: If Parratt
v. Taylor18 8 is praised for eliminating many § 1983 cases, or damned
because it allows too many cases to remain, then the reader knows
where the writer stands. In other cases, the author's views remain completely obscure, as where the author simply advocates an "effective"
enforcement of § 1983 without many specifics. In neither case, howI have advocated expansive readings of the Constitution and § 1983's remedy in an earlier
work, see Beermann, supra note 164, and I intend to do so in the future, most immediately in a
forthcoming article on official inaction and the Constitution. A more general theory regarding § 1983 would resemble Gerald E. Frug's work, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1057 (1980), or Alan David Freeman's Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978), in that it
would state normative premises and then attack the Court's doctrine whenever it deviated
from those premises. I am content here largely to confine my attack to the Court's method
and save my substantive attack for other work.
186. See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731
(1987).
187. Most of the articles about § 1983 make no mention of the political or even principled reasons for following their proposed course, even when the suggestions made would
have great effects on the utility or scope of § 1983. One commentator, after recognizing that
his interpretation might greatly decrease the protection afforded by § 1983, attempted to reassure the reader that other statutes and actions in state courts would provide the same protection now provided by § 1983. See Zagrans, supra note 11, at 591-98. If that is the case, then
the focus of the article should have been on forum selection rather than the merits of the
§ 1983 questions.
188. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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ever, does the author explicitly argue for one or another political
view. 189 Professor Eisenberg may be right that there are two fundamentally conflicting views of § 1983-one which confines it to remedying the racist and lawless conditions in the post-Civil War South, and
another which presents it as a tool of enforcement to be used against
constitutional violations everywhere.' 90 But even where an author
clearly holds one or the other view, his reasons for doing so are very
rarely discussed explicitly.
My argument that judges and commentators should make explicit
the political views that motivate their interpretations is an argument
both for political discussion and for candor. Arguments for candor
have often been made, usually focusing on judicial candor, and usually
resting either on a moral preference for honesty in the legal system or
on policy grounds such as predictability. For example, David Shapiro
rests his argument for judicial candor on a moral preference for honest
judicial decisions.' 9 1 By contrast, Robert Leflar has argued for candor
primarily on utilitarian groundsI 9 2: Honest judicial decisions, he
claims, not only make the law more predictable, 93 but they create better policy as well because they explicitly consider the potential conse19 4
quences of the rule they adopt.
My argument for candor in § 1983 analysis rests on both moral and
utilitarian premises. I share the moral preference for honesty in judicial decisions and believe that academic writing should explicitly address the political views that motivate even technical doctrinal work. I
also think that if the political premises of the arguments for and against
liberal enforcement of § 1983 were made explicit, the legal community
would find the Supreme Court's limitations on § 1983 liability inconsistent with American constitutional ideals. This last belief may be mistaken, and, indeed, a consensus might form against civil rights
enforcement. 19 5 But given the existing trend in that direction, the risk
189. See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, De-FederalizingCommon Law Torts: Empathy for Parratt, Hudson and Daniels, 28 B.C.L. REV. 813 (1987). The title of Brown's article suggests that he
favors limiting federal § 1983 jurisdiction in tort cases against state officials. In the body of
the article he reveals his position by characterizing the Court's desire to eliminate tort actions
against state officials from the § 1983 docket as a "sound premise." Id. at 816. But despite
his thorough analysis of the doctrinal aspects of the official tort problem, he does not defend
this position or even attempt to explain why the Court's premise is sound.
190. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundations and an Empirical Study,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 484-87 (1982).
191. See Shapiro, supra note 186, at 736-38. Shapiro also finds a certain utility in judicial
candor.
192. See Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 721, 737 (1979).
193. See id. Judge Posner makes a similar argument in his attack on the use of law clerks
and staff attorneys to write opinions. Without careful supervision, he contends, clerk-drafted
opinions might not reflect judges' beliefs, leaving lawyers and litigants with fewer clues about
the ultimate direction of the law. See RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 113 (1985).
194. See Leflar, supra note 192, at 723-35.
195. I acknowledge that my argument is optimistic. Cf Lawrence Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 500 (1987) (noting that the
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is worth taking.
Arguments against candor in legal writing have focused mainly on
adjudication. For example, critics of legal realism warned that talk of
how judges' political views influenced their decisions would threaten
legal stability and judicial legitimacy. No doctrine, they objected,
would be safe from political manipulation, and the public would lose
confidence in judicial decisions if it doubted that judges apply objective, neutral legal rules. More recently, Critical Legal Studies scholars
have been accused of threatening the stability of the legal system and
the rule of law through96their attacks on the alleged neutrality and determinacy of legal rules.'
liberation from doctrine is not necessarily progressive; "practical" arguments can arise on
both sides of any issue).
196. Some scholars will argue that my critique of the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence is too demanding, that while the Court might do a better job ofjustifying its choices
among sources of law and sets of policies, no radical change in its method is necessary. See,
e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1989). Further, because many cases
are easy and many decisions are predictable, some scholars have contended that law is at most
"moderately indeterminate" or "underdeterminate," but not so radically indeterminate as I
have claimed. See id.; Solum, supra note 195; John Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 332 (1986).

For several reasons, the critiques of the indeterminacy critique do nothing to weaken my
attack on the Supreme Court's § 1983jurisprudence. First, Joseph Singer has shown that the
concepts of predictability and determinacy are not related in the way the critics suggest. Predictability does not necessarily imply determinacy. Joseph William Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). Stick, however, is confused on the
significance of predictability, at one point asserting that it is related to determinacy, Stick,
supra, at 354-55, and at another point stating that the two issues are distinct, id. at 365. And
while § 1983 outcomes are relatively predictable, it is the political and legal views of the
judges who decide the cases, not the "legal reasoning," which makes them predictable.
Second, the fact that cases in other areas of law might be easy does not refute any of my
criticisms of the Court's § 1983 jurisprudence. The cases I have discussed here are not
"easy," because, as I have shown, several alternative outcomes and modes of analysis are
possible. While, in my experience, all legal doctrine fits this description, I need only worry
here about § 1983 cases.
Finally, the most serious challenge to my critique is that I have attacked only the straw
man of an outmoded, rigid, rule-based system of legal reasoning, and that a more contemporary, sophisticated theory of legal reasoning could accommodate all of the value-based arguments and doctrinal uncertainties I have identified. As Kress argues, "Law may be
determinate without there being a mechanical method for deciding legal questions." Kress,
supra, at 332. I do not agree that there is a coherent theory of legal reasoning that defeats the
critical indeterminacy thesis. Critics of the indeterminacy thesis do not apply their theories to
actual cases, and I find it difficult to understand how their description of legal reasoning escapes the indeterminacy critique. Sometimes they suggest that all that is necessary to refute
the indeterminacy thesis is that lawyers are able to argue about the soundness of a decision.
See Stick, supra, at 365. The critic's argument seems to come down to a rather silly statement
that since lawyers were able to argue the cases, since judges were able to write legal opinions,
and since lawyers are now able to have legal discussions about the opinions, the legal system
must be determinate.
The point of this article, however, is that the legal language used in those discussions,
since it is contradictory and incomplete, does not contain the actual reasons for the decisions.
The fact that lawyers can talk about those cases using that language is part of the problem.
The critics' attempts to construct a complex version of legal reasoning to establish determinacy have proven a waste of time and energy. Instead, the better course would be to redirect
that energy toward the formulation of a political vocabulary to replace the legal one, and
toward the exploration of the new vocabulary's ramifications.
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The problem with these arguments against candor is that they
blame the messenger who bears the bad news. Those who would prefer a § 1983 jurisprudence that safely relied on the intent of Congress
are uncomfortable with suggestions that text and history do not answer
all the relevant questions, and they fear the results of "political" judging. The argument against candor in these matters asserts that judicial
discretion does not exist because it should not exist. Critics of candor,
however, have no effective solution to the problem of general statutes
like § 1983. In some circumstances, the intent of Congress (or at least
its practice) has been to pass general legislation and delegate to the
federal courts broad discretion in interpretation. 1 9 7 Because "political" judging may be perfectly consistent with congressional intent, the
argument against candor, at least with respect to general statutes like
§ 1983, should as much be addressed to Congress as to the federal
courts.
A more plausible argument against candor is that, against a background of political disagreement, it would be difficult to write generally
acceptable opinions which relied explicitly on political views. Even arguments from general legal and constitutional principles are likely to
be controversial, and unless we confine ourselves to the narrow arguments from principle that appear as adjuncts to doctrinal argument, we
will be treading on terrain that is unfamiliar to lawyers. Explicit political discussion in legal opinions seems inconsistent with the role of a
judge as many have long understood it.
I have argued, however, that at least with respect to general statutes
like § 1983, there is no alternative to "political" judging: Text and history provide such meager guidance that the issue is whether political
reasoning will be candid or covert, not whether politics can be excluded
from judging altogether. In full recognition of the difficulty of this task,
I think it is time to develop a vocabulary that can open a moral and
political discussion of how much enforcement of civil rights there
should be-a vocabulary that frankly recognizes the uncertainty inherent in policy judgments as to the effects of § 1983 enforcement.
In what follows, I discuss the political and policy judgments that
must be made in § 1983 cases. I attempt to illustrate that the real
grounds for the debate over civil rights enforcement lie in the political
disagreements between liberals, conservatives, and radicals. I do this
by outlining the ways in which each group frames the issues important
to § 1983 litigation. Finally, I return to policy arguments, attempting
to combine political awareness and skepticism about policy into a pragmatic approach to § 1983 litigation.
197. Section 1983 is one example. Others include the Sherman Act, which is even more
general than § 1983. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Judge Posner has pointed out that federal
courts must, due to the nature of legislation, often engage in the common law process of
elaborating federal statutes. See R. POSNER, supra note 193, at 300-01.
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Three PoliticalImages of Section 1983 Litigation

It would be impossible to describe separately all of the political
views of § 1983 that have been articulated (orjust assumed) since 1871.
But that would be unnecessary for my present purpose of orienting the
political discussion of § 1983. Just as one can, as a first approximation,
classify general political theories as conservative, liberal, and radical, so
too can political views of § 1983 be sketched in these dimensions. The
accounts of the various political stances that follow are not intended to
exhaust all possible views or to describe precisely any particular set of
views; I recognize that many people will hold views from different sets.
However, in social theory, and particularly in social criticism, the use of
ideal types has long been considered a useful method of investigation.19 8 The way these various sets of views should be understood here
is as an attempt to create typologies of viewpoints about § 1983, and to
use them to open up discussion of the issues along the lines presented,
not to describe the views of any particular judge or theorist. Because
these "ideal types," "paradigms," or "images" are rarely found in pure
form, they highlight the themes that do appear frequently, thus providing useful perspectives, points, and orientation for the discussion that
follows.
1.

The liberal,rights-basedreformist perspective.

Persons taking the liberal, rights-based approach to § 1983 believe
the statute to be a potentially effective tool of civil rights enforcement.
Section 1983 plaintiffs, in this view, are powerless victims of abusive
state and local government. These abuses threaten the set of rights
that § 1983 is designed to protect-the rights enshrined in the liberal's
view of the Constitution. With some play at the margins, these rights
are relatively determinate, and the liberal insists that they be interpreted correctly. Limiting § 1983, whether by narrowing rights or restricting remedies, is thus an attack on the true constitutional order.
One paradigm victim of governmental power is the state prisoner.
The liberal sympathizes with the prisoner on several grounds. 19 9 First,
the liberal senses that whatever their misdeeds, most criminals have
themselves been victims of social injustice, and that without that injustice they would probably not be prisoners. Second, the liberal believes
198. Max Weber explained the method this way:
[Tihe kind of terminology and classification set forth above has in no sense the aimindeed, it could not have it-to be exhaustive or to confine the whole of historical
reality in a rigid scheme. Its usefulness is derived from the fact that in a given case it
is possible to distinguish what aspects of a given organized group can legitimately be
identified as falling under or approximating to one or another of these categories.
For certain purposes this is unquestionably an important advantage.
MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 383 (1947).
199. Many other § 1983 plaintiffs can be portrayed as powerless victims, such as the
fired civil service employee or the mistreated local resident up against an uncaring local bureaucracy or a vicious local political machine.
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that the procedural rights of criminal suspects, defendants, and convicts are both important in themselves and inextricably linked to other
individual rights that the Constitution guarantees. Third, the liberal
believes that the conditions in prison are, in fact, terrible and that absent constitutional guarantees, prison guards and officials would have
virtually unrestrained power to abuse their prisoners. If anyone in our
society is treated the way blacks were treated in the post-Civil War
South, it is prisoners. 20 0 Finally, even if the plaintiff is not a sympathetic character herself, it would be impossible to construct rules that
would exclude the bad plaintiffs without also eliminating the deserving
ones.
By contrast, this vision suspects local officials of possible incompetence, unconcern, or corruption, and sees the local political system as
factional, fractious and subject to capture. The background narratives
of the liberal approach are stories of police brutality and official insensitivity, together with the history of local government's resistance to desegregation. The only way to prevent repeat episodes is for the federal
government to protect constitutional rights from state and local attacks.
The liberal hears in contemporary federalism an echo of states' rights
rhetoric of the segregationist past.
The liberal believes strongly in the rule of law and in the Constitution. The liberal approach values individual rights over federalist principles, and thus would narrow the immunities and limits on
justiciability: Violations of individual rights and state overreaching, the
liberal maintains, must not go unremedied. This approach sees the genius of the Constitution in its establishment of real limits to government power over individuals, and thinks that this value would be
undermined if § 1983 litigation were curtailed.
The liberal approach sees § 1983 litigation as at least one way of
vindicating these rights. Liberals differ on the effectiveness of § 1983,
however, with some preferring a system of administrative remedies that
would spare plaintiffs the uncertainties and delay of litigation. 20 ' But
even if § 1983 is procedurally imperfect, and even if a deterrent effect
on civil rights violations is difficult to establish, the liberal finds symbolic value in strict federal enforcement, and is confident that the symbolism is not entirely lost on potential law-breaking local officials. This
view sees the federal courts as the forum of principle, insulated from
the political pressures that turn other government institutions into civil
rights violators.
In sum, the liberal supports the expansion of constitutional rights
and the increased legislative protection of civil rights over the past few
200. See Whitman, supra note 150, at 68.
201. See, e.g., id. at 70. Alternatively, some claim that § 1983 could be made more effective by replacing individual liability with liability against governmental entities. See id.; PETER
H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 100-21 (1983).
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decades. The liberal approach may recognize that the judicial activism
of the sexual and reproductive privacy decisions is difficult to defend,
but as long as the activism is in line with proper political views, the
liberal will leave well enough alone.
2.

The conservative, authority-defendingperspective.

What I am calling the "conservative" perspective sees the prevailing
distribution of wealth and power as generally benevolent, or at least
benign. In this view, state and local government officials conscientiously do their best to respond to the local community, but they stagger under the crushing burden of governing, and are often
encumbered by federal interference. 20 2 While occasionally they make
good faith mistakes, the cause of the problem is not official abuse of
power, but the pressure of a difficult job made more difficult by federal
meddling. 20 3 In the criminal justice system, for example, police and
prosecutors by and large respect criminals' rights in substance, even if
they sometimes make technical mistakes; their efforts to combat crime
are too often thwarted by a judiciary that has failed to understand the
real needs of law enforcement. Officially sanctioned segregation is
from the distant past, and accusing local governments of racism is like
accusing the government of West Germany of responsibility for Nazi
crimes. State and local officials have been unjustly insulted by the liberal attack.
The conservative image of the civil rights plaintiff is quite different.
Most prisoner plaintiffs are looking for a diversion from the routine of
prison life, and their constant litigation is usually frivolous, unfounded
and a nuisance: They clog the courts with their endless attempts to
escape punishment. 20 4 Other civil rights plaintiffs, in this view, make
federal cases out of things that are essentially local matters, often trying
to win a fight in federal court that has already been lost in the local
executive or legislative forum. 20 5 These plaintiffs are lured to federal

202. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 605, 624-37 (1981).
203. The Supreme Court's recent decisions on the scope of the due process clause attempt to confine the reach of the § 1983 remedy to official abuses of power. See Deshaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007 (1989); Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 329-32 (1986). And the Court appears to be willing to assume that officials,
even when making mistakes with grave consequences, were acting in good faith. See Deshaney,
109 S. Ct. at 1007 (hypothesizing an explanation for a social worker's failure to intervene in a
family situation to prevent child abuse); see also Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 524-27
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the presumption that local officials will act in good faith to follow
the Constitution, but recognizing that injunctive relief is appropriate to force such
compliance).
204. See Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that prisoners use the time "on their hands" to bring frivolous cases, that prisoners often lie in these cases, and that the cases create a heavy burden on the federal courts);
note 18 supra.
205. See Philly's, the Original Philadelphia Cheese Steak, Inc. v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.).
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court by the prospect of attorneys' fees and a sympathetic judge. And
the decisions they protest were probably correct to begin with; for example, fired employees who allege civil rights violations were probably
fired for good reason. 20 6 The only legitimate civil rights plaintiffs are
victims of racial discrimination and, perhaps, victims of violations of
some of the Bill of Rights. Even these cases should be viewed with
suspicion, however, because they do not happen very often.
The conservative image of the Constitution and its enforcement is
complicated. On the one hand, it presents the United States Constitution as the embodiment of the most enlightened government in the history of the world; its genius lies in the limits it places on government.
While government must be restrained from undue interference with individual rights, the individual rights the conservative has in mind are
more likely to be property and contract rights than, for example, the
free speech, criminal procedure, and privacy rights which the liberal
celebrates. The conservative takes the indeterminacy of "privacy"
rights in particular to be different in kind from the inevitable blur at the
boundaries of other rights. This indeterminacy, together with the undemocratic character ofjudicial review and the perceived gulf between
the federal courts and local needs, makes the conservative quite suspi20 7
cious of using federal law to promote the liberal agenda.
These mixed feelings about the Constitution lead the conservative
to presumptions against justiciability and judicial enforcement of most
individual constitutional rights, and presumptions in favor of defenses
such as the immunities that protect state and local administration from
federal attack. Federalist limits are of constitutional pedigree too, the
conservative reminds us. And not only federalist principles, but also
practical reasons counsel narrow § 1983 liability. These practical reasons are that § 1983 litigation wastes resources, puts distant federal
judges in charge of local administration, sacrifices the greater good to
claims of a few individuals, 20 8 and may even fail on its own terms by
making local governments lazy about constitutional matters because
they expect the federal courts to step in and correct any constitutional
mistakes.
3.

The radical, "tool of oppression" perspective.

The keystone of the radical approach to § 1983 is its demand that
206. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168-71 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in the
result) (relying on government's interest in removing "employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch" to deny employee a pre-termination hearing).
207. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. I
(1971).
208. For a discussion of the reasons applied to eleventh amendment immunities, see
Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). "Any resulting disadvantage to the plaintiff was 'outweigh[ed]' by 'the necessity of permitting the Government to
carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial intervention.' " Id. at 113-14 (quoting
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949)).
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the statute be applied substantively, empowering people to control
their own lives. Within the context of the current liberal/conservative
dominance, however, this demand leads the radical toward ambivalence
regarding § 1983. On the one hand, the radical views § 1983 litigation
as a tool of oppression which helps maintain the existing distribution of
power. By correcting some highly visible problems, the legal system
creates the false impression that constitutional enforcement protects
individuals from oppression, and thus it diverts attention from potentially fruitful methods of social change. The radical deplores the formalistic terms of the debate between liberals and conservatives that
depoliticize political issues and foreclose the possibility of radical
reform.
On the other hand, the radical agenda for reform resembles the liberal scheme in some ways. Both advocate greater recognition of some
personal rights and greater participation in important decisionmaking.
And on many particular issues, the radical position is close to the liberal, rights-based view. Both distrust state and local government officials; they agree further that § 1983 combats state and local
governments' abuse of power, the frustration of participation, and the
evasion of limits on governmental action. But the radical hardly trusts
the federal government: Both the federal and local governments, according to the radical, abuse their citizens all the time. And one problem with § 1983 is that its inevitably selective style of reform may
empower federal officials as much as the victims of governmental
abuse.
The radical dilemma arises from the apparent choice between recognizing the plaintiff's rights or not: While the radical will choose to
recognize them, she will still worry that successful civil rights litigation
will pacify victims of social injustice and divert resources away from
more productive methods of social change, such as community organizing. Thus, the radical sympathizes with individual plaintiffs against
government officials, but shares the conservative's skepticism about social change through litigation, albeit for different reasons.
The radical distrusts federal judges, but not for the conservative's
reasons. To the radical, doctrines such as the immunities and limits on
justiciability demonstrate judicial hostility toward victims' claims and
the inevitable limits on even modest change within the American constitutional order. In the radical view, federal judges are privileged
members of the ruling class no more likely to further radical change
than the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While the expansion of constitutional
rights in recent years might be good in theory, in practice it has
brought little if any benefit for the less fortunate. 2 09 The radical has
very little hope for genuine change without the radical redistribution of
209. See Peter Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism:How the Burger Court'sPolitical Imagery Legitimizes the Privatizationof Everyday Life, 52 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 263, 268 (1984).
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wealth, but believes that § 1983 litigation is not likely to produce significant redistribution.
The radical's views about reform through law are colored by context. The rule of law, while preferable to unrestrained governmental
terrorism, at present looks like a powerful conservative force. Thus,
while the radical favors more protection for the powerless, she doubts
that judicial activism will fundamentally democratize social institutions.
And only this democratization, the radical thinks, could make the
changes that the radical political agenda requires. The radical would
like, therefore, to redirect the rights debate toward recognizing the
kinds of rights connected to radical change. And here, where the discussion turns to long-term goals, the radical and liberal part company,
with the radical looking toward institutional reform that would create a
much more democratic society in which people radically increase their
control over their lives.
C. The Effects of Section 1983 Litigation
Each of the political views described above presupposes a view of
the policy effects of § 1983 enforcement. This is true despite our neartotal ignorance of the magnitude of these effects, both on the ability of
state and local government to function and on the degree of constitutional compliance. The legal literature contains no substantial empirical studies of these issues. While we can logically assume that greater
liability will tend to increase compliance with the Constitution and
make local government more expensive, the magnitude of those tendencies is not similarly predictable.
The failure to distinguish between tendencies and magnitudes is
perhaps the central weakness of policymaking under § 1983 and elsewhere. Reasoning about tendencies without considering magnitudes
creates a false consensus, since widespread agreement about the former does not imply agreement on the latter. For example, the proposition that legislative liability would make local legislators more cautious
about trying new programs is uncontroversial, but how much they
would be inhibited-not to mention how we should evaluate their inhibition-is much more difficult to determine. Perhaps other factors
make them so timid already that liability would not make much difference; perhaps all but the most courageous legislator would avoid introducing any new programs, or perhaps widespread insurance or
government indemnification would ameliorate the effect. General
political views, in their relationship to legal policy views, influence
which conjecture we choose, and how much of the private interest in
compensation we think should be sacrificed.
The policy discussions in the § 1983 literature have generally confined themselves to tendencies, not magnitudes. This weakness is crucial, since so many important issues in § 1983 litigation are said to turn
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on a trade-off between governmental effectiveness and compensation
for (or deterrence of) constitutional violations. As one commentator
put it in the immunities area, the issue is "how to balance the twin concerns of protecting officers and insuring compensation to the victims of
their misdeeds." 21 0 But we have no real empirical evidence of the effects that expansive liability would have on local administration, and,
thus, no way to "balance" the competing tendencies rationally. Stating
the issue as one of "balancing" opposed tendencies of uncertain magnitude invites unreflective conjectures that will predictably correlate
with one's prior political views on the subject. Further, the "balancing"
metaphor deflects attention from the political issues that lurk just below the surface.
The Court's analysis suffers from the same weakness. Its emphasis
has recently been on the potential costs that § 1983 imposes on government. These costs range from the immediate dollar cost of a damages judgment paid out of public funds, to the loss of governmental
services whose funding has been diverted to pay the judgment, and,
finally, to the expense of litigation even if the local government or official wins the case. The potential costs also include the "costs" of official timidity that the threat of litigation presumably induces. 21 1
However, nothing in the Court's opinions suggests the magnitudes of
these costs, or even a method by which to calculate them. Nor does the
Court compare these costs to the private losses from constitutional
violations.
The political views of an author, whether judge or commentator,
influence which costs appear more real and more important. The liberal is likely to see high costs from constitutional violations and potentially large gains from increased enforcement. Further, the liberal is
likely to discount the costs to government administration either as
small, or as clearly outweighed by the benefits of imposing the costs of
unconstitutional conduct on government 2 12 and ensuring constitutional compliance. The conservative, on the other hand, views the potential costs to local government as crippling and the gains to victims as
either small or undeserved, because of the phoniness of many claims
and the illegitimacy of many "rights." Because no empirical evidence is
available, only the ideology of the author appears to influence which
213
costs and benefits the author finds most important.
The fact that the empirical questions raised in § 1983 cases are diffi210. See Matasar, supra note 11, at 792-93; cf. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters.,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2218, 2223 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing balancing in negative
commerce clause cases as comparing the length of a line to the weight of a rock).
211. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (emphasizing the chilling effect
of damages liability on the "vigorous exercise of official authority" (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-05 (1978))). The costs of official timidity are presumably greatest
where the official will have to satisfy the judgment personally.
212. See Wells, supra note 11, at 81.
213. See Beermann & Singer, supra note 143.
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cult does not mean that these issues should be ignored. But neither
should the policy issues be decided as they have been in both cases and
commentary. A better approach would be pragmatic, opening the discussion to empirical evidence of the effects different rules would have,
2 14
and inviting reassessments if the results were not as anticipated.
This pragmatic approach should not be aimed at establishing certainty
regarding social reality. Rather, it has the more modest goal of making
a serious attempt to investigate the effects of legal rules, recognizing
that these effects are always contextual, and, thus, subject to change
with the passage of time and the modifications of circumstances.
A pragmatic approach to § 1983 litigation would base decisions on
empirical arguments-such as the argument that police liability for
false arrests would dangerously chill enforcement-only if data supported these arguments. The Supreme Court might even allow disagreements among circuits to remain, so that it could assemble
comparative data. The Court should not cast its decisions in terms of
congressional intent, so that it will feel more free to reverse itself if its
empirical judgments are proven wrong. And it should admit when it is
uncertain, so that parties will be encouraged to offer data and arguments for reversal. Because many § 1983 litigants would be unable to
afford the expense of conducting detailed studies, the courts should
encourage others to do so. Government agencies, advocacy groups,
private interest groups, and universities all could be called upon to do
research and offer the results to courts through publications and as
amici.
Courts and commentators should also assess more closely the effects of nonenforcement on victims of civil rights violations. Until now,
neither the victim's interest in compensation nor the potential victim's
interest in deterrence has often entered the Court's calculus as to the
proper scope of § 1983. Organizations and individuals advocating civil
rights enforcement should, thus, be encouraged to come forward with
data on the costs of nonenforcement.
I recognize that labeling the Court's approach to policy "pragmatic"
will not magically transform its method. But the recharacterization of
policy arguments in terms of pragmatism is meant to be more than a
semantic change. Rather than simply the old balancing of the plaintiff's interest in compensation against the government's interest in effective functioning, the discourse should be open to broader political
and empirical questions. The constitutional norms that § 1983 enforces should be established by the same consequentialist analysis I
have recommended; once the Court has identified a constitutional
norm, its commitment to constitutional limits should not be sacrificed
without hard evidence that granting a remedy would seriously hamper
214. I agree with William Whitford on the value of empirical research. See William C.
Whitford, Lowered Horizons: Implementation Research in a Post-CLS World, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 755.
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the greater good. And even then the diminution of remedies should be
narrowly tailored and open to reassessment. Because the Court's judgments would have a broader focus and be explicitly revisable, the Court
would be free to make decisions in light of all relevant factors, without
focusing narrowly on government interests and enshrining those interests as statutory intent.
The objection may be raised that opening court proceedings to expert testimony and studies regarding the likely effects of various statutory interpretations makes the court look more like a legislature. On
this familiar view, the legislature makes policy, and the courts simply
defer to that policy judgment. But as I have argued, courts commonly
engage in policy reasoning when they apply general statutes-including
not only the civil rights statutes, but also antitrust and copyright laws,
just to name a few examples. 215 If fault lies anywhere, it is with the
Congress that writes statutes which plainly call for judicial policymaking. Unless Congress suddenly decides to write a detailed code of civil
rights enforcement, instead of general statutes like § 1983, the federal
courts must make policy and political judgments if the statutes are to
have any application at all. I argue only that they should do so explicitly and self-consciously.
D.

Moral, Politicaland PragmaticAspects of Civil Rights Enforcement

The politics of the different images of § 1983-not text, history, or
policy in the narrow sense-explain the differences among judges and
commentators. Neither group, however, has forthrightly addressed the
political questions involved. Judicial opinions rely on false history and
policy, while commentators tacitly assume their political views about
§ 1983 rather than argue for them explicitly. In this subsection, I attempt to explain how politics influences § 1983 analysis, and to show
how positions on some central issues-immunities, remedies, amenability to suit, and "color of law"--can be better understood in light of
political arguments.
1. Immunities.
The argument over immunities captures many of the political differences over the proper scope of § 1983. The liberal's opposition to immunities is consistent with her general views about § 1983 litigation.
Immunities threaten the statute's role in pursuing social change and
combating abuses of government power. Immunities increase the
powerlessness and alienation of civil rights victims by denying a remedy
even where there has been a violation. The liberal may acknowledge
that constant § 1983 litigation could hamper local government's ability
to function, and perhaps he might allow some narrow immunities in
215. See R. POSNER, supra note 193, at 294-315.
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particularly sensitive areas, such as judicial immunity from damages.
But generally the liberal will view the costs of § 1983 litigation as part
of the cost of maintaining constitutional government-something the
liberal believes we should be willing to bear. 2 16 The liberal's real philosophical objection to the immunities is that they are inconsistent with
the rule of law and recent constitutional developments: The immunities place official conduct above the law, and subvert the expansive
readings of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment that have
become established over the past few decades. To recognize rights
without granting effective remedies, the liberal argues, is plainly
inconsistent.
The conservative's sympathy for expansive immunities is also consistent with his general views about § 1983. The conservative is suspicious of § 1983 plaintiffs, and believes that § 1983 suits only harass,
distract, and discourage local officials who are trying in good faith to
serve the public. Litigation, the conservative thinks, is an ineffective
tool for social change, and judicial activism threatens the only legitimate avenue for social change-the legislative process.
The conservative may acknowledge in principle the Marbury v.
Madison dictum that all rights have remedies, but she will still argue that
this dictum should have no effect in § 1983 cases. First, many of the
rights potentially protected under § 1983 are illegitimate, the product
ofjudicial activism that has gone far beyond the Constitution. Second,
even where the "rights" claimed are legitimate, the realities of government have made it impractical to enforce all rights through damages
actions, and the courts should trust the political process to correct important deficiencies in the observance of rights.
The radical's reaction to this debate is twofold. First, because they
make officials less accountable and more likely to transgress democratically established limits, the immunities should be criticized as impediments to radical social change. Second, the radical sees the immunities
as an illustration of the contradictions in the liberal theory of American
constitutional government. The irony of conservative defenders of the
Constitution favoring broad immunity for constitutional violations only
supports the radical's general views about the system. And the liberal's
willingness to compromise by allowing narrow immunities is, if anything, more confused than the conservative view.
Part of the disagreement between the liberal and the conservative is
about government's ability to function under the threat of liability and
how the immunities for governmental bodies affect the enforcement of
the constitutional guarantees of § 1983. Commentators and courts
should try to discover the effects of the immunities. Local governments
should put forth data on the effects of liability. Civil rights groups
should produce evidence of the costs of looser enforcement of civil
216. See text accompanying note 212 supra. But see text accompanying note 210 supra.
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rights. Courts should take a pragmatic approach to the policy questions surrounding the immunities. They should be willing to experiment with different levels of immunity, to admit when they are
uncertain about policy, and to encourage
the parties to bring forth data
2 17
on the effects of the immunities.
2.

Remedies.

Remedies issues are treated extensively above, but a few comments
here will illustrate the political nature of the controversy. The liberal
view favors broad injunctive relief to help prevent as many § 1983 violations as possible, while the conservative views injunctions as undesirable judicial interference with the political system. The liberal may
favor a more generous measure of damages, because civil rights victims
deserve compensation, and because damages relief will deter violations. 218 The conservative favors narrow measures of damages, lest
civil rights plaintiffs receive windfall recoveries and innocent local officials be punished for honest mistakes.
The radical view here is close to the liberal view, but it more closely
connects the issue of remedies to the cause of increased democracy and
self-determination. Courts should interpret the Constitution to guarantee, and should grant remedies to advance, institutions that allow for
local, democratic control and eliminate illegitimate hierarchies.
3. Persons.
The liberal favors expanding the definition of "persons" subject to
suit under § 1983 to include state and local governments and their officials, for all of the reasons that she desires more effective § 1983 enforcement. Governmental bodies should be deemed "persons," the
liberal thinks, because they are more able than individual officials to
pay damages and prevent violations. The conservative, in contrast,
would limit the definition of "person" to protect government from suit,
hoping that victims will not bother to sue judgment-proof officials. The
conservative would not include states and state agencies as persons, so
that federal courts, or state courts applying federal law,2 1 9 would not

meddle in state affairs.
The radical would define "person" by comparing the substantive
consequences of different interpretations. Because government institutions oppress people in ways that a § 1983 remedy might combat, the
217. Of course, the decisionmaker may hold political views so strongly that he could not
be persuaded to decide against them by any empirical evidence of the immunities' effects.
218. The liberal desire to preserve constitutional limits and the rule of law may make
prevention through injunctions preferable to compensation through damages. See Whitman,
supra note 150, at 70.
219. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989) (holding
that states and state officials sued in their official capacities are not "persons" suable under
§ 1983).
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radical would define them as "persons." But to the radical, the whole
debate is symptomatic of mainstream relapses into formalism 220 and
renewed indulgence of the long-discredited public/private distinction.
Here again, no definition of "person" can be discovered in the language or history of § 1983. The issue is largely one of politics and, to a
lesser extent, policy. The policy involved is minimizing federal court
intervention into the affairs of state government.. But before accepting
a narrow definition of "person," the federal courts should demand
some evidence of the effects that different definitions would have on
government agencies. Talk about tendencies toward friction and interference is no substitute for realistic assessment of the actual
consequences.
4.

Under color of law.

Section 1983 grants a remedy only if the defendant has acted under
color of state "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." The
big issue here is whether conduct that is contrary to state law can none22 1
theless be "under color of" state law if performed by a state official.
The liberal favors an expansive definition of "under color of" that
would allow § 1983 to attack a broader category of unconstitutional
conduct, thus preserving constitutional values and the rule of law. The
liberal sees government officials as involved in a significant amount of
illegal conduct, and § 1983 as a necessary weapon against the renegade
official. The liberal sees great symbolic value in allowing a federal remedy even where a state remedy is also available: The federal court, in
the liberal view, is the guardian of civil rights. But the weakness in the
conventional liberal argument is the absence of any but symbolic rea2 22
sons for a redundant remedy.
The conservative, on the other hand, thinks that it makes sense to
limit "under color of" to conduct authorized by state law, because if
the state official acts illegally under both federal and state law, a remedy
will probably be available in the state courts.2 23 The conservative image of § 1983 generally is that if it does anything, it overrides state laws
that are unconstitutional, thus granting a remedy against action taken
pursuant to unconstitutional state laws. 2 24 Arguments based on con-

servative federalism favor as little federal intervention as possible: If
220. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (relying upon the
Dictionary Act and legislative history to determine whether cities are "persons," without any
reference to policy considerations).
221. See Zagrans,supra note 11, at 500-0 1.
222. But see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-30 (1977)
(federal district courts preferable to state appellate courts for a plaintiff's constitutional
claims: they provide (1) less uncertainty, expense, and delay; (2) greater technical competence; and (3) insulation from majoritarian pressures).
223. Zagrans argues that states should be required to provide a remedy for conduct that
violates both federal and state law. Zagrans, supra note 11, at 594.
224. See id. at 502, 595, 597.
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the state grants a remedy of its own, the civil rights plaintiff should be
required to pursue that remedy before suing in federal court. The embarrassing aspect of the conservative position, however, is that it would
subject to § 1983 liability those officials who follow, in good faith, a
state law that turns out to be unconstitutional, yet exonerate officials
whose conduct violates both state and federal law.
While the radical sympathizes with the liberal desire to bring more
official conduct under § 1983 scrutiny, she scorns this argument over
the meaning of the words "under color of" law, which reenacts the
public/private distinction that was exploded long ago. For the radical,
almost all action involves state power, and private abuse of contractual
rights is as much under color of law as police brutality. The state defines the contours of power, and § 1983 should be used to attack any
concentration of power that prevents people from controlling their
own lives. The radical views the argument between the liberal and the
conservative as an example of how both are still stuck in formalism.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There is no excuse for retaining the traditional methods of construing § 1983. The Court's manipulation of text, legislative history and
policy is transparent, especially when it jumps merrily from one source
of law to another. The indeterminacy of the Court's choice of law rules
has led commentators to seek a definitive construction or application of
§ 1983. Commentators who have recognized the indeterminacy of the
text and history of § 1983 would replace doctrinal analysis with political
analysis, in the form of conjectures about the effects of proposed applications of § 1983. The political motivations for the various suggestions, however, have remained hidden, impoverishing the debate and
dooming the analysis to a new formalism, in which policy arguments
are made and accepted with no real attempt to determine their truth
through research or testing.
The way to understand the controversy over § 1983 is to understand its political and ideological aspects, and to open the process to
real assessment of the facts rather than stylized policy arguments.
What is needed are data regarding the social costs of more or less enforcement, and straight talk about a political vision for § 1983-a vision
that explains the author's preference for more or less expansive
liability.
Section 1983 can be a helpful tool for reform, but only if it is freed
from its troubled history. The statute can be used, together with progressive constitutional doctrine, to move toward greater democratization of local institutions and to maintain official accountability. But
§ 1983 will not become useful in this way through better legal reasoning. Rather, such change will only happen through a social movement
that will reshape legal consciousness along progressive lines.

